Evaluation of LWR fuel performance under transient and off-normal conditions by Knudsen, P.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners 
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal  
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
   
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Dec 19, 2017
Evaluation of LWR fuel performance under transient and off-normal conditions
Knudsen, Per
Publication date:
1979
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Knudsen, P. (1979). Evaluation of LWR fuel performance under transient and off-normal conditions.  (Risø-M;
No. 2211).
Rise-M-2211 
EVALUATION OF LHR FUEL PERFORMANCE UNDER TRANSIENT AND 
OFF-NORMAL CONDITIONS. A REVIEW OF RECENT REPORTS 
Per Knudsen 
Abstract. Reports from the meetings at Petten (Nov. - Dec. 1978), 
Portland (April-May 1979) and Aries (May 1979) have been reviewed 
together with various reports related to the Three-Mile Island 
accident. The reports were selected to cover transients in normal 
operation (power ramps, load-following) as well as off-normal 
transients. 
INIS descriptors. BWR TYPE REACTORS, CANDU TYPE REACTORS, FUEL 
ELEMENTS, PERFORMANCE, PWR TYPE REACTORS, REVIEWS, TRANSIENT 
OVERPOWER ACCIDENTS, TRANSIENTS. 
UDC 621.039.548 : 621.039.524.44 : 621.039.514.45 : 621.039.588 
November 1979 
Risø National Laboratory, DK 4000 Roskilde, Denmark 
ISBN 37-550-0644-2 
ISSN 0418-6435 
Risø Repro 1980 
CONTENTS 
Page 
INTRODUCTION 1 
SUMMARY 3 
1. Power Ramping 3 
2. Load-Following 7 
3. Progress in US Safety-Related Research on Fuel 
Behaviour 10 
4. Three-Mile Island Fuel Performance 12 
APPENDIX A: Petten Meeting A-l 
Paper List A-l 
Review of Papers A-3 
APPENDIX B: Portland Meeting B-l 
Paper List B-l 
Review of Papers B-6 
APPENDIX C: Aries Meeting C-l 
Paper List C-l 
Review of Papers C-4 
APPENDIX D: Three-Mile Island D-l 
Paper List D-l 
Review of PaDers D-3 
- 1 -
INTRODUCTION 
The present review paper has been prepared according to a request 
by the International Atonic Energy Agency (Vienna). The subject 
areas to be covered were defined as follows: 
(a) Performance during transients in normal operating, e.g. 
(i) power ramps at startup after refuelling, or at return 
to full power after extended low-power operation, (ii) load-
following operation. 
(b) Performance during off-normal transients: (i) progress in 
US safety-related research on fuels behaviour, (ii) Three-
Mile Island (TMI) experience. 
The reports to be reviewed_were_the following^ 
(a) Papers from the following technical meetings: 
- "Ramping and Load Following Behaviour of Reactor Fuel", 
Petten, 3C November - 1 December 1979, 
- "Light Water Reactor Fuel Performance", Portland, 
30 April - 3 May 1979. 
- "Power Ramping and Power Cycling of Water Reactor Fuel 
and Its Significance to Fuel Behaviour", Aries, 14-17 
May 1979. 
(b) Available TMI reports, including the US assessments expected 
to be published Fall 1979. 
The following chapter is a summary of the reviewing, whereas 
details are given in appendices A-D: one for each meeting and 
one for the TMI reports. Each appendix has a paper list; reports 
with content relevant to this review are marked with the sign 
"$" and are reviewed in a reasonable degree of detail following 
the paper list. The reports are grouped as follows: 
Appendix No. of reports Reports reviewed 
A. Pet ten 13 6 
B. Portland 40 17 
C. Ar ies 20 14 
Rt-jmi u u 
Total 86 48 
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Strictly speaking, the title of the review excludes reports 
on CAMDU and PHHR fuel performance; such papers were, however, 
included because they do give information of general relevance 
to water reactor fuel performance. 
The reports selected for review are those which present direct 
experience, or evaluations based on various kinds of observation. 
It has not been attempted to include reports mainly dealing with 
predictions, sensitivity studies and other types of analyses 
using fuel performance codes. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that most of the reports within 
subject area (a) "normal operation" are from fuel vendors; it 
would probably have been interesting if more reports by fuel 
users, i.e. utilities, had been available. 
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SUM4ARY 
The content of this summary has been subdivided according to 
the subject areas of the review: power ramping; load following; 
US-safety related research; Three-Mile Island experience. 
1. Power Ramping 
Most of the reports reviewed were presented by fuel suppliers 
and organizations associated with specific reactor and fuel 
systems. In addition, there were reports from utilities and 
from research organizations. The following sections are orga-
nized accordingly. 
1.1. Kraftwerk Union (A6, B3. Bil, C6, Cll) 
The KNU operating guide lines for standard (pre-pressurized) 
PWR fuel and BWR 8x8 fuel (also pre-pressurized) are summarized 
as follows: 
(a) optimized operating mode: 
- PWR axial offset control 
- BWR fixed control rod withdrawal sequence 
(b) no rate limitations for load cycling: 
- start-up during operational cycle 
- load-follow operation 
- frequency stabilization 
(c) rate limitation to less than 5%/h only: 
- in the high power range (above 65 to 80% depending on 
plant and fuel design) 
- during the first start-up after refuelling or extended 
part-load operation. 
Most of the ramping experience presented is for pre-pressuri-
zed PWR fuel, from power reactors as well as test reactor irra-
diation programs. PCI failure thresholds, below which ramps 
of any height and rate do not lead to failure have been defined 
as follows: 47-48 kW/m after 1 cycle (^12,000 MWD/tU) and 42 
kW/m after 2 cycles Cv-23,000 MWD/tU). With modified ramps, i.e. 
with rates in the range 0.01-0.5 kW/m. min, it was possible 
to go to terminal levels about 6 kW/m higher than the above 
thresholds without failure. At burnups below 10,000 MWD/tU no 
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PCI defects could be generated in power or test reactor ramps. 
For power reactors, PCI failures developed only in one in-
stance in an older plant not equipped with the automatic 
system for axial offset control. 
The reported BWR experience is for 7x7 unpressurized fuel. 
Here the failure thresholds are considerably lower: about 37 
kW/m at 5,000 MWD/tU and 33 kW/m at 10,000 MWD/tU and above. 
In start-up after refuelling and control rod pattern exchange, 
ramp rates of 3X/h are acceptable up to 80« of rated power; 
at higher levels, the rate should be limited to lx/h. 
1.2. ASEA-ATOM (A9, B7, C14) 
Operating recommendations in the two A-A BWR units in Barse-
beck restrict the local ramp rate to 0.25 kw/m.hr above 27 
kw/m or the previously preconditioned power level. As a re-
sult, the fission product activity in the primary circuits and 
in the off-gas systems is extremely low and indicates a near-
perfect fuel condition. 
PCI failure levels in test reactor ramps at ^15,000-25',000 
MWD/tU comprising some tens of test rods is typically of the 
order of 45 kW/nu When some thousands of full-size rods in a 
power reactor are exposed to fast ramps, a small number of 
low-probability failures can be generated below 40 kW/m; they 
are not necessarily accompanied by either plastic deformation 
of the cladding or excessive fission gas release. It should 
be noted that the power increase rate in a power reactor may 
be much faster than in a test reactor; also, the power profile 
may be axially distorted during the ramp in a power reactor. 
By far the most powerful way of reducing the probability of 
PCI failure was found to be to restrict the ramp rate and to 
avoid step-wize changes. 
1.3. General Electric (Bl, B29) 
Design changes and operating recommendations (PClOMRs: pre-
conditioning .interim operating management recommendations) 
have reduced fuel rod failure rates to a reported level of 
0.028* for 8x8 BWR fuel. Very little information is given on 
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these changes; it can be inferred from the Barsebeck paper (B7) 
that the PCIOMRs are fairly similar to those used in Barse-
beck. 
A number of PCI remedies are being examined in comparative 
ramp tests below 10,000 MND/tU. The preferred solutions appear 
to be internal barriers or liners on the inner cladding sur-
face: either 5-10 wm Cu or 75 urn pure Zr. 
1.4. SGHWR (A8, C12) 
Data on defected fuel rods were obtained from six fuel elements 
that were moved to more highly rated channels. A total of 17 
fuel rod failures occurred in three of these fuel elements 
(there are 36 fuel rods per element). The data for the six 
elements do not contain individual pin details; they are summa-
rized as follows: 
No. of Mean burnup Ramp terminal levels, kW/m 
elements range, MWD/tU
 p a i l e d e l e m e n t s U n f a i l e d elements 
4 5,000-7,000 36-51 34-41 
2 10,000-12,000 31-33 38-39 
Fission gas releases were reported for a failed element at 
each burnup level as 6% and 2«, respectively. 
1.5. CANDU (B18, C15) 
Of some 150,000 CANDU fuel bundles irradiated in power reac-
tors only 0.18* have failed and 84% of these failures resulted 
from power ramping. The incidence of defects was greatly re-
duced as a result of the following measures: 
- the introduction of graphite CANLUB fuel, 
- changing the fuelling sequence, thereby flattening the flux 
profile and reducing the peak power from 60 to 53 kW/m; also 
the adjuster rod insertion sequence was changed to avoid 
power transients on starting up reactors following a short-
term shutdown. 
Since the introduction of these changes, the fuel bundle de-
fect rate has been 0.06%. 
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As an alternative to graphite CANLUB. a coating of siloxane is 
being developed. The experience so far is limited but encoura-
ging; no defects were experienced with siloxane at heat loads 
relevant to CAHDO power reactors. 
1.6. Other Observations 
Experience at the Gundremmingen BMR <A1) indicates that power 
rasps starting at 20-35 kW/m and ending at 45 kW/m are danger-
ous.It is concluded that fast reaps above 35 kW/m should be 
avoided. 
With five operating PMR's, Kansai has had a total of 19 leakers 
among 1534 fuel assemblies (C2). This low failure rate is seen 
as a result of design and Manufacturing improvements as well 
as restrictions on rate of power change. At initial start-up 
after refuelling and also after a long period of low power 
operation, the rate of power increase at higher power is limi-
ted to 0.5*/hr. After a "sufficient" preconditioning is finished, 
the rate of power increase can be 3X/hr. It is hoped that rates 
of 3-5*/hr may be possible in the future without preconditio-
ning, when results from various test programs are available. 
The Inter-Ramp program (A5, B30, C17) with 8x8 type BWR test 
rods produced failure in fast ramps above about 42 kW/m. There 
was no clear dependence on burnup (10,000 or 20,000 MWD/tU) or 
design details such as gap size and cladding heat treatment. 
Two rods had incipient (non-penetrating) cladding cracks at 
terminal power levels of 41 and 48 kW/m. (Incipient cracks 
were also seen in a sound reference rod ramped to 49 kW/m in 
the 6E test program (B29)).At ramp terminal levels above 42 
kW/m the transient fission gas release (during 24 hrs) increa-
sed from a low value of 3* to a value of 25* at 51 kW/m. 
Information about fission gas release at various combinations 
of ramp terminal level and hold-time is also given in other 
papers (B28, C18). 
1.7. "Fuel Performance - What Kext ?" 
Some of the conclusions from the panel discussion of the 
Portland meeting are listed below: 
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(a) Fuel oust be able to reach extended burnups, i.e. 40,000-
50,000 NlD/tU (batch average) because reprocessing is 
being postponed in the USA. and also owing to higher 
uranium costs(yellow cake as well as enrich—nt). 
(b) The desire for extended burnup leads to emphasis out 
- fission gas release 
- PCI performance 
- burnable poison 
- waterside corrosion. 
(c) In operation, there will be emphasis on: 
- sore in-core instrumentation 
- use of on-line computers for continuous monitoring of 
core conditions 
- restricted use of control rods in BWR's. 
(d) More PCI-resistant fuel will be required, especially in 
BMR's; possible solutions are the Cu barrier or Zr liner 
concepts. 
2. Load-Following 
On load-following, as well as on power ramping, the sore ex-
tensive reporting was by KWU. In addition there was brief infor-
mation on experience with and requirements to Westinghouse and 
FRAMATOME PWR'S. 
2.1. Kraftwerk Union (A6, Bil, C6) 
The conditioned power of a fuel segment is normally the maximum 
steady state power in some burnup or time interval (the length 
of which is not defined in the reports). It is the general ex-
perience that power cycling within the conditioned power does 
not lead to failures even above the PCI failure threshold (see 
para. 1.1.) and with high power change rates. Present KWU PWR's 
are designed for fast load follow operation (5-10%/min) in a 
fully automated way. A combined power and power distribution 
control system based on fixed in-core detectors limits local 
power and axial off-set. BWR's are also designed for fast load 
follow operation with 10x/min by rod control and up to l*/sec 
by flow control. Fuel operating guide lines for KWU LWR's have 
no rate limitations for power cycling within set limits for 
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the distortion of the power distribution. 
For the PMR plant used for illustration in paper Bll. there 
has been a number of temporary load reductions for various 
reasons. The number of power cycles with amplitudes oP>10* PR 
from above to below 80* P_. for instance, ranged up to 110 
per operating cycle. Power increase rates of typically 1-5* 
Pg/min have been used. Frequency stabilization (amplitude <5«) 
was successfully applied in one plant for about 1 month du-
ration at 100* power. In another (?) case, scheduled part load 
operation was performed towards the end of cycle 1. with return 
to high power in intervals <1 month with l-2*/min. max. ramp 
rate at a burnup of level of 12,000-14,000 MHD/tU. A PBHR plant 
has been partly base-load operated and partly used for weekend 
load-follow operation. About 80 power cycles up to 30* P_ ampli-
tude have been accumulated. 
With a M R plant with 7x7 fuel, substantial power cycling ex-
perience has been accumulated by shut-down/start-ups or tempo-
rary load reductions. Power increase rates of l-2*/nin were 
normally applied. Reactor power cycles in the range 30-100* PR 
did never produce failures. 
2.2. Westlnahottse (B12) 
Region 3 of Point Beach-2 has a nominal linear heat rating of 
18.7 kW/m and operated under load-follow conditions. During 
three cycles of exposure, the region experienced 528 load-
follow cycles. A typical daily load-follow was 100-70-100 
with power increases of 0.3-0.8*/min. Coolant activity data 
showed that load-follow and burnup (exceeding 36,000 MWD/tU) 
had no significant effect on fuel integrity. 
2.}. KMifj Electric power (C2) 
Load-follow operation will be required for Kansai nuclear po-
wer plants possibly starting in 1985, for example with the 
pattern 12-3-6-3 (100S-50* rated power), (i.e. 12 hrs at 100*, 
3 hrs decrease to 50*, hold 50* for 3 hrs, 3 hrs increase to 
100*). This can be done by changing the boron concentration and 
using only max. 30* control rod insertion. This results then 
in a power increase of about 3 kW/m, above the preconditioning 
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level at the position of peak local heat flux (about 36 kW/m). 
The corresponding power increase (above preconditioning level) 
in a fuel rod adjacent to the control rod is 7-10 kW/m, but 
this is in the upper part of the core where the general power 
level is lower. The rate of change in core average power (20-
23 kW/m) is of the order of 0.05 kW/m.min, i.e. very gradual. 
(A daily power cycle schedule similar to the above is also 
being considered by TVA (C3)). 
2.4. EDF/FRAMATOME (C4, C22) 
EDF PWR plants will be required to participate in load-following 
to an increasing extent from 1980-81. Programmed power varia-
tions must be possible at a rate of 2%/min. of nominal power. 
In compensating for forecast error or production unit loss, 
(unplanned) power variations at 5%/min. will be necessary. 
Automatic frequency control must be possible within a band of 
-5% of nominal power; inside such a band, manual power varia-
tion must be possible at 1.5%/min, exceptionally at 4.5%/min. 
Present PWR plants do not meet these requirements. Programmed, 
large power variations may occur by variation of the boron 
concentration; this permits about 2%/min. at the beginning of 
the cycle and 0.3%/min. at the end of the cycle. It is believed 
that frequency control operation for extended periods will be 
possible within ^2.5%. 
An experiment is underway in a small PWR where load-follow 
(planned power changes) and remote control (adjustments accor-
ding to grid needs) is simulated with 12 fuel elements from 
two batches. 
Details of the operational mode are as follows. The load follow 
cycles have a reduced power at 75% of rated power in 30% of the 
cases, 50% in 60% of the cases and 30% in 10% of the cases. The 
corresponding power increase rates are max. 0.5, 0.5-1.5 and 
min. I.5%/min., respectively. During 50% of its life, the fuel 
is subjected to a remote control amplitude of -6.5% (of rated 
power) around the instantaneous power level. (No specific in-
formation is given regarding the frequency of the load swings 
simulating load follow and remote control). 
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At the present, the total number of load cycles is 300 and 200 
for the two fuel batches and the corresponding average burnups 
are 22,000 and 11,000 MWD/tU, respectively. So far there is 
no indication of damage to the fuel rods resulting from this 
mode of operation. 
3. Progress in US Safety-Related Research on Fuel Behaviour 
Session III-B of the Portland meeting had reports on these 
types of experiments: loss-of coolant, power-cooling mismatch, 
and reactivity-initiated accidents. 
3.1. Loss-of-Coolant Experiments (B19) 
The Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT) reactor has been scaled to simu-
late the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of a large PWR in a 
loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Numerous thermocouples measure 
the cladding surface temperature during the experiments. 
In the first nuclear experiment, the maximum heat load just 
prior to the transient was 26.4 kw/m. The report gives infor-
mation on the cladding temperature during the first 35-45 s of 
the transient, until the core was cooled by ECC water. The peak 
cladding temperature was 780K; it occurred just after the ini-
tial departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) and lasted for a few 
seconds. Temperatures in the range of about 400-680K were re-
ported for the rest of the period. The activity of the coolant 
indicated that no fuel failures occurred during the test (no 
post-irradiation information is given). 
The maximum calculated cladding temperature was just below 
1000K, i.e. about 200K higher than the maximum measured level 
during the experiment. Various tests did not reveal any selec-
tive cooling effects of the cladding surface thermocouples. 
3.2. Power-Coolina Mismatch (PCM) (B22) 
Hypothesized accidents to be considered in safety analyses in-
clude various off-normal power or cooling conditions, these 
are called power-cooling mismatch accidents because the heat 
generated in the fuel is not removed properly. If DNB occurs 
during a PCM event, fuel rod damage may occur. In current licen-
sing the rod is then assumed to have failed, although a rod 
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can operate in film boiling and incur significant damage before 
actual failure. 
PCM experiments are being conducted in the Power Burst Facility 
(PBF). where 22 unirradiated, 9 previously irradiated and 7 
fuel rods with irradiated cladding and fresh fuel have been 
tested. The rods are about 1 m long PWR type rods; they were 
operated under stable film boiling conditions from 30 s up to 
about 12 min. with peak heat loads ranging from 50 to 78 kW/m. 
The fuel rods can operate in film boiling and incur significant 
damage without failure. At temperatures above 920K, the cladding 
has sufficient ductility to accommodate the strains associated 
with cladding collapse and waisting (clad collapse into pellet 
interfaces). Failure due to oxygen embrittlement during film 
boiling does not occur until the cladding has been nearly comple-
tely reacted to ZrO. and oxygen-stabilized alpha, with an equi-
valent cladding reacted value of 24%. Hydriding has been an em-
brittlement mechanism only in rods that have failed prior to 
or during film boiling. Molten fuel-cladding contact., with the 
potential for cladding melting, can occur as a result of molten 
fuel relocation. However, cladding melting has not occurred in 
the PBF tests when molten fuel has contacted the cladding, and 
the reaction between the cladding and fuel has not been signi-
ficant. Fuel swelling has occurred in previously unirradiated 
rods due to thermal effects, and to a larger extent in irradiated 
rods due to the additional effects of retained fission gas. 
However, fuel swelling has not resulted in rod failure or sig-
nificantly affected the behaviour of rods with burnups ranging 
up to 17,000 MWD/tU. 
The primary rod failure mechanism in unirradiated and irradiated 
fuel rods is oxygen embrittlement of the cladding. 
3.3. Reactivity-Initiated Accidents (RIA) (B23) 
The rapid, inadvertent insertion of reactivity into a LWR core 
(by control rod ejection) is a potential mechanism for fuel rod 
failure. A series of RIA experiments are being conducted in the 
PBF with coolant conditions typical of hot-startup in a commer-
cial BWR. Six tests have been completed with unirradiated and 
previously irradiated fuel rods. 
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Energy deposition in the test fuel appeared to be the single 
most important variable. The failure threshold of previously 
irradiated fuel was about 150 cal/g. The failure mechanism 
appears to be stress-corrosion cracking due to pellet cladding 
interaction. The failure threshold of unirradiated rods is 
between 230 and 270 cal/g. Unirradiated rods subjected to 270 
to 280 cal/g experienced extensive cracking and crumbling 
apparently due to cladding wall thickness variations and com-
plete oxidation of the thin sections. Previously irradiated 
test rods which were subjected to an energy insertion of 320 
cal/g UO» swelled and blocked the coolant flow channel. Unirra-
diated test rod damage at an energy insertion of 320 cal/g 
was extensive but did not result in coolant flow blockage. 
4. Three-Mile Island Fuel Performance 
In the course of the events of the TNI accident , the reactor 
coolant pumps were stopped at 1.7 hrs and it was expected that 
natural circulation would occur. Due to the decay heat, however, 
the coolant began to boil down. As a result, a substantial frac-
tion of the core was uncovered at 2.5 hrs and had experienced 
sustained high temperatures. The core was not covered again 
until about 3 hrs. There remains some uncertainty whether or 
not there was some additional periods of core uncovery during 
the first 12 hrs. Most of the core damage described below most 
likely occurred during the first period of uncovery. At 3.8 hrs, 
a section of the core apparently slumped down, forming a 
"rubble bed" in the upper portions of the core. 
The assessment of the core damage is based on various measure-
ments and their evaluation, such as: 
- system pressure 
- coolant temperature, flow and level 
- incore and excore neutron flux detector signals 
- radiation level in the reactor building 
- fission product release to primary coolant and reactor 
containment 
- hydrogen release. 
It is estimated that there were failures in the cladding of 
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about 90% of the fuel rods. There are various estimates of the 
extent of zirconium oxidation, ranging from 33-63% of all the 
zirconium in the core. The upper 60-70% of the zirconium 
cladding is so embrittled that it has lost its structural in-
tegrity. The fuel rods may have failed by ballooning and rup-
ture before the more extensive damage by oxidation and embritt-
led fracture. As a result of vhe damage, the coolant flow path 
through the core is blocked to an extent corresponding to an 
average core blockage of 93% (30 days after the accident, the 
transition to cooling of reactor coolant by natural circulation 
was performed). 
There are various estimates of the fuel temperatures. Signifi-
cant melting of partly oxidized cladding probably occurred. 
Some of the fuel,perhaps only a small amount, may have become 
liquid at temperatures well below its melting temperature of 
2880°c, as a result of reaction with liquid zirconium. The 
severely oxidized/fused cladding probably fragmented into pieces 
ranging from fine particles to whole sections of fuel rods. 
In the hottest portions of the core, the temperature of un-
fuelled components was probably only slightly lower than the 
fuel rod temperature. Consequently, control rod guide tubes of 
Zircaloy should have oxidized/melted, and components with In-
cone i (spacer grids), stainless steel and Ag-In-Cd (control 
rods) should have melted. 
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APPENDIX A 
"RAMPING AND LOAD FOLLOWING BEHAVIOUR OF REACTOR FUEL 
PETTEN, 30 NOVEMBER - 1 DECEMBER 1978 
Paper_List_^S_means_paper reviewed) 
SESSION Ii INTRODUCTION 
S Al. Significance of Fuel Performance during Reactor 
Operation - N. Eickelpasch, R. Seepolt (Kern-
kraftwerke Gundrenuningen Betriebsgesellschaft 
mbH) 
SESSION II; RAMP TEST TECHNIQUES 
A2. Power Ramp Test Techniques at Studsvik - U. Bergen-
lid, G. Lysell, H. Mogard, G. Roennberg, H. Tomani 
(Studsvik Energiteknik) 
A3. Leistungsrampenversuche im HFR Petten. Versuchs-
technik und Versuchseinrichtungen - J. F. W. 
Markgraf (JCR Petten), I. Ruyter (KFA Jlilich), 
F. Sontheimer (KWU Erlangen) 
A4. Les dispositifs d'irradiation utilises en France 
pour étudier les rampes de puissance - Rosemarie 
Atabek, Ghislain de Cbntenson (CEA-CEN Saclay) 
SESSION III: RESULTS OF RAMP TESTS 
S A5. The Studsvik Inter-Ramp Project. An International 
Power Ramp Experimental Program - Garry R. Thomas 
(Electric Power Research Inst. Palo-Alto, Cai., 
USA) 
S A6. Results and Analysis of KWU Power Ramp Investigations -
R. Holzer, H. Stehle (KWU Erlangen) 
A-2 
Paae 
S A7. Experience du CEA sur le comportement en transitoire 
des combustibles uo.-gainés zircaloy - J. Delafosse. 
G. Lestiboudois (CEA-CEN Saclay) A-6 
S A8. Power Ramp Experience in the Winfrith SGHWR (U.K.) -
A. Garlick. R. Sumerling, A. Stuttard (AEA. Wind-
scale NPDL), G. G. Bond, D. A. Howl (AEA, Spring-
fields NPDL), W. N. FOX (AEA, Winfrith AEE), D. 
Cordall, R. M. Cornell (Berkeley NL, CEGB) A-7 
S A9. ASEA-ATOM Results on PCI-Experiments on Fuel Rods. 
A Review - S. Jungkrans (ASEA-ATOM Vaesteraas, 
Sweden) A-8 
SESSION IV: FAILURE MECHANISM IN CONNECTION WITH RAMPING 
AlO. Potential Causes of Failures Associated with Power 
Changes - P. Bouffioux, J. Van Vliet, P. Deramaix, 
M. Lippens (BelgoNucléaire Brussels) 
All. Cracking of Cladding Tubes Caused by Power Ramping 
and by Laboratory Stress Corrosion Experiments. 
A Review of the Activities at the Kjeller Labora-
tories and at the Halden Project - K. Videm, L. 
Lunde, K. Svanholm, T. Hollowell, K. Vilpponnen, 
C Vitanza (Kjeller, Norway) 
A12. Predicting Load Following Damage - J. H. Gittus, 
D. A. Howl (UKAEA, Springfields NPDL) 
A13. Discussion on Mechanisms of PCI Defects - M. Peehs, 
F. Garzarolli, E. Steinberg (KWU Erlangen) 
A-3 
"RAMPIKG AND LOAD FOLLOWING BEHAVIOUR OF REACTOR FUEL" 
PETTEN. 30 NOV. - 1 DEC. 1978 
The Significance of Fuel Performance During Reactor Operation 
(Eickelpasch et al., Gundra—ilngen) (Al) 
To avoid cladding failures due to PCI during operation, the 
fuel suppliers have issued recommendations to the utilities. 
These operating recommendations are based on the fact that be-
low a certain power level no cladding failure has been observed, 
no matter what the loading rate was. Above this power threshold, 
local power changes should be accomplished only by small loa-
ding rates (no specific data for such power threshold is men-
tioned) . However, recommendations with regard to fuel conditio-
ning should net be considered as the ultimate technical solution. 
A plot of local power ramps which have caused PCI defects at the 
Gundremmingen (BWR) reactor indicates that ramps starting at 
20 -35 kw/m and ending at 45 kW/m are dangerous (no further 
details such as burnup are given). 
Fission gas release data from one Gundremmingf»n fuel assembly 
(burnup ?) shows max. 3 t release at (average ?) pin heat ra-
tings up to 30 kW/m increasing at 31 kW/m and upwards, with 
a maximum of 16 t shown at 38.5 kW/m.This max. release was ob-
tained for the pin closest to the control rod and which experi-
enced the largest ramps. Vhis pin location also showed comparably 
high failure rates during fuel inspections. It is concluded that 
fast ramps above 35 JcW/m should be avoided during power reactor 
operation and that new fuel should be designed accordingly. 
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The Studsvik Inter-Ramp Project, An International Power Ramp 
Experimental Program (Thomas, EPRI) (A5) 
This paper was the first publication about the Inter-Ramp Project. 
Another paper on the same subject, giving more results, was pre-
sented at the later ANS meeting in Portland (May 1979). To avoid 
duplication here, reference is made to the review of the Port-
land publication (paper B30). 
Results and Analysis of KWU Power Ramp Investigations (Holzer 
et al., KWU) (A6) 
Power cycling, for instance due to daily load follow, grid power 
fluctuation, or frequency stabilization is not expected to be 
a problem for fuel integrity. Power ramping, i.e. increase of 
the power above the envelope of heat load reached in the previous 
irradiation history, can lead to fuel failures. Therefore, KWU 
is investigating power ramping performance in operating power 
reactors as well as in ramping experiments in test reactors. 
In power reactor fuel performance evaluations, pre-pressurized 
PWR fuel has shown a 0.1 % failure probability threshold of 
42 kW/m at 15,000 MWD/tU and higher burnups and about 49 
kW/m at 10,000 MWD/tU. For unpressurized BWR fuel, a "horizon-
tal" threshold of about 33 kW/m is indicated at 10,000 MWD/tU 
whereas the value is around 37 kw/m at 5,000 MWD/tU. Pre-pressu-
rization seems to have a stronger effect on the ramping behaviour 
than the details of fuel rod geometry. This is attributed to 
the higher helium inventory in the pre-pressurized fuel rods, 
which suppresses the thermal feed back effect which may occur 
during and shortly after the ramp. 
In-situ power ramp experiments have been performed in two PWR's 
with 130j and mix-oxide fuel, in the burnup range 11,000 - 30,000 
MWD/tU. In all three experiments, the ramp terminal levels were 
below the defect thresholds established in the Petten ramp tests 
(see below). All the experiments resulted in zero failures. 
The Petten experiments use short fuel rod segments which have 
been pre-ramp irradiated in a power reactor. Results are repor-
ted for pre-pressurized PWR fuel. Mainly two types of ramps 
have been performed up to now, i.e. start-up ramps and in-situ 
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ramps. Start-up ramps simulate the start-up after refuelling 
with different rates to a maximum given power level. Therefore, 
no intermediate "conditioning" in the test reactor is performed. 
In-situ ramps simulate local variations in the heat load with-
out prior shuffling of the fuel (e.g. changes in the axial flux 
profile). Therefore, in this type of experiments a "pre-condi-
tioning" period at about 30 kw/m in the test reactor is invol-
ved. 
In fast ramps, a ramp rate of 10 kW/m. min was used; here the 
PCI effect apparently does not depend strongly on ramp rate. 
Based on the idea that the failure threshold for fast ramps 
might be exceeded without defects by applying a lower ramp 
rate in the upper range, "modified" in-situ ramp tests were 
introduced. These tests are conducted with a ramp rate of 10 
kw/mjnin up to a power level just below the threshold, and then, 
after a short delay, the power increase is continued at a lower 
speed up to the final power level. 
The ramp terminal level is maintained until failure indication 
or for 48 hrs. 
Start-up ramps were conducted with rates of about 0.05, 1 and 
10 kW/m. min in the range from 30 to 55^60 kw/m. Only the 
highest ramp rate gave cladding failure. The burnup corresponded 
to one power reactor cycle. 
In-situ ramps were carried out at burnups corresponding to one 
and two reactor cycles (about 12,000 and 25,000 MWD/tU). with 
a rate of 10 kw/m. min, the corresponding power threshold 
(ramp terminal level) necessary to cause failure was 47 and 
42 kw/m, respectively. With modified ramps, i.e. with rates 
in the range 0.01-0.5 kW/m.min, it was possible to go to terminal 
levels about 6 kw/m higher than the above thresholds without 
failure. 
At burnup levels below about 10,000 MWD/tU no PCI defects could 
be generated in power or test reactor ramps. 
It is concluded that PCI defects are not a serious factor in the 
present operation of modern LWR's. The KWU fuel operating re-
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commendations as outlined below, for standard PWR and BWR 8x8 
fuel, are practically negligible with respect to plant availa-
bility: 
(a) optimized operating mode: 
- PWR axial offset control 
- BWR fixed control rod withdrawal sequence 
(b) no rate limitations for load cycling: 
- start-up during operational cycle 
- load-follow operation 
- frequency stabilization 
(c) rate limitation to less than 5 %/h only: 
- in the high power range (above 65 to 80 t depending on 
plant and fuel design) 
- during the first start-up after refuelling or extended 
part-load operation. 
Experience du CEA sur le comportement en transltolre des 
combustibles UO^-gainés Zircaloy (CEA's Experience with Tran-
sient Performance of Zircaloy-Clad CO,, Fuels) (Lestiboudois et 
al., CEA) (A7) 
Results from fast ramp tests with U02-Zr fuel pins have been 
used to evaluate the power increase AP necessary to cause cladding 
failure, as a function of the fast neutron fluence of the cladding. 
AP is the difference between ramp terminal level and the power 
20 21 2 level of gap closure. A fluence range of 5x10 to 3x10 n/cm 
was covered. The smallest values of AP were at fluences around 
21 2 1.5x10 n/cm . This can be explained in terms of mechanical 
interaction, because burst tests with irradiated Zircaloy cladding 
20 21 
tubes show a minimum ductility (<1%) in the range 5x10 - 2x10 
2 
n/cm , depending on clad heat treatment. 
21 2 
A fluence of 1.5x10 n/cm is achieved during the first cycle 
of exposure of PWR fuel. The AP minimum reported for the ramp 
tests was around 4-6 kw/m. To this must be added the power 
increase required to close the gap, to get the real power in-
crease failure threshold. Thus it is important to have sufficient 
margin to gap closure, especially during the first cycle of ex-
posure . 
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Power Ramp Experience in the Winfrith SGHWR (Garlick et al-, 
UKAEA/CEGB) (A8) 
Changes in fuel rating in SGHWR arise from three main causes: 
(i) changes in total reactor power according to grid demands, 
(ii) the control actions of the reactor, (iii) refuelling. De-
monstration of satisfactory fuel endurance under daily power 
cycling conditions, and minute-by-minute fluctuations have been 
carried out (no details given in the paper). The reactor power 
level is controlled by a combination of small changes in modera-
tor height and dissolved boron content; this results in changes 
in local power distribution of only a few per cent. Larger power 
changes may result from refuelling. Elements adjacent to a re-
fuelled channel may experience power increase of up to about 
10 %. If an element is radially shuffled part-way through irra-
diation it may experience much larger changes. 
Data on defected fuel rods were obtained from six fuel elements 
that were moved to more highly rated channels, five of the ele-
ments being moved in planned experiments. A total of 17 fuel rod 
failures occurred in three of the fuel elements (an element has 
36 fuel rods). Power increase rates were in the range 1-3.4 t 
of rated power per minute. Data for the six elements are summa-
rized in the below table (the paper does not give individual pin 
details): 
Element 
FBR996 
QPL879 
UGA237 
JKQ340 
HRY291 
PHF968 
Mean burnup 
MWD/tU 
6,000 
7,000 
5,600 
10,C00 
5,900 
11,600 
Fuel rod rating, kW/m 
pre-ramp 
25.5-31.5 
28.2-28.9 
27.2-38.6 
26.9-27.2 
32.1-41.1 
23.0-30.4 
post-ramp 
35.8-38.6 
33.9-34.6 
45.9-50.7 
38.3-39.0 
36.0-41.1 
31.1-33.0 
Ro-i failures 
2 
None 
9 
None 
None 
6 
The failures were typical SCC type PCI failures. Fission gas 
releases were reported for two of the elements: max. 6 % for 
FBR996 and max. 2 % for PEF968. 
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ASEA-ATOM Result on PCI-Bxperiments on Fuel »ods. A Review. 
(Junkrans et al., ASEA-ATOM) (A9) 
The paper is a review of information most of which has already 
been published. A summary of the observations is given below: 
(a) Reducing the raap rate strongly reduces the PCX failure 
probability. The raap rate dependence clearly dominates 
over effects froa ainor design modifications (e.g. changes 
in pellet density and clad thickness). 
(b) The amount of permanent deforaation does not determine the 
risk of PCX failure. As already mentioned, the failure 
potential depends strongly on the ramp rate. The permanent 
deformations of the cladding does not, however, vary sig-
nificantly with the raap rate and can therefore not be 
used for correlating fuel rod failures. 
(c) PCI failures are not necessarily accompanied by excessive 
fission gas release. One example is non-failed fuel rods 
located adjacently to failed rods in the Oskarshamn 1 
in-core ramp test. Gas release in two non-leaking rods was 
0.1 %. Furthermore, both failed and non-failed rods showed 
the same amount o* fission products deposits on the clad 
and no pellet grain growth for all rods. 
(d) The Oskarshamn 1 in-core ramp test in July 1975 was designed 
to generate a comparison between test reactor data and power 
reactor performance. The intent was to perfora a severe 
experiment with a rather high probability of some fuel 
failures to obtain this comparison. Extreme test conditions 
which are not applicable to normal reactor operation were 
used and the subsequent fuel inspection revealed a number 
of failed rods. Since the failure levels and power incre-
ments were rather low in coaparison to R2 test, extensive 
postanalyses have been carried out. One exaaple is mechani-
cal model calculations which treated the effect of axial 
forces caused by a varying axial power profile during the 
almost momentary ramp. It is also necessary to consider 
that in a test reactor there is a limited number of rods 
exposed over say 10 cm fuel length whereas in a power ramp 
in a power reactor hundreds of meters of fuel rod length are 
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involved. Combining these two investigations, it ties conclu-
ded that the failures caused by the Oskarshaan 1 in-core 
rasp agree well with raap testing experience fro* the R2 
reactor. 
(e) One PCI nswdy design being explored has internal copper-
plating of the fuel cladding. 20 reisp tests in the R2 test 
reactor at burnups of 5-20.000 MID/tU showed the copper-
plated rods to riMin intact where reference rods fail. 
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Review of Papers 
BWR Fuel Performance (Baily et al., GE) (Bl) 
Fuel design changes introduced in 1973-75 to alleviate the PCI 
problem were: Shorter, chamfered pellets to reduce local clad 
stresses and a decrease in fuel rod diameter (8x8 configuration 
in stead of 7x7) to reduce the fuel rod power level. Special 
plant operating recommendations formulated in 1973 reduced the 
fuel duty. The combined effect of these changes and the steps 
taken to eliminate the problem with excessive moisture in the 
fuel have reduced the fuel rod failure rate by two orders of 
magnitude: from 0.98X for 7x7 to 0.028* for 8x8. Further improve-
ment is expected from the recently introduced pre-pressurization 
of the fuel rods with 3 atm. He; this results in a fuel tempera-
ture reduction equivalent to a reduction in fuel duty of 1H-3 
kW/m. 
The Performance of Combustion Engineering Fuel in Operating 
PWR's (Andrews et al., C-E)(B2) 
An early batch of C-E fuel experienced PCI/SCC induced fuel rod 
perforations in the first cot', of Maine Yankee (see EPRI NP-218, 
Nov. 1976). The fuel in that core was subject to in-reactor den-
sification; when combined with the lack of pre-pressurization, 
the fuel operated at higher temperatures than does modern fuel 
at equivalent power. Since 1974, all of C-E's fuel has been pre-
pressurized and has incorporated other design changes. Pellets 
were chamfered, and the length-to-diameter ratio was reduced from 
1.7 to 1.2. Pellet density was increased to 95« TD and the degree 
of in-reactor densification was reduced. Clad wall thickness was 
increased from 0.026 to 0.028 in. for added conservatism. 
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Following these changes, PC7./SCC essentially has been eliminated 
as a cause of fuel rod perforation. Since 1975, no utility has 
found it necessary to leak test C-E fuel. The current fuel rod 
defect level (from all causes of fuel rod perforation) is less 
than 0.01X. 
KWU Fuel Performance With Emphasis .on. High Bumups (Garzarolli et 
al., KWU) (B3) 
Test programs performed by KWU in cooperation with other organi-
zations have resulted in the determination of power thresholds 
for PCI defects under fast ramping. The results have been dis-
cussed in detail at the Petten meeting Dec. 1978 (paper A6, Holzer 
and Stehle). The threshold decreases slightly with increasing 
burnup to about 15,000 MWD/tU and seems to stay rather constant 
at higher exposures. This was proven up to 30,000 MWD/tU and has 
to be confirmed for higher burnups. 
In practice, the PCI risk at high burnups is mainly influenced 
by the duty cycle of the fuel which depends on the core manage-
ment strategy. Decreasing power with increasing burnup in later 
cycles minimizes not only the risk for PCI defects but is also 
advantageous for the other mechanisms discussed. Also, from a 
mechanistic point of view, there are several reasons to assume 
that the PCI failure probability does not become more severe 
at extended burnups. First, the power distribution profile 
across the fuel rods shows an increasing suppression in the 
center because of the increasing Pu-fissioning fraction at the 
outer pellet rim. Second, the increasing oxygen activity and 
the increasing Pu concentration in the fuel may lead to a fuel 
softening. In addition, the irradiation effects in the Zircaloy 
cladding material are already saturated at the lower burnups. 
PCI is not expected to become a problem when expanding the 
target burnup of the present (PWR) design to the range of 55,000 
MWD/tU. 
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LWR Reactors (Soter et al., EHC) (BS) 
During the October 197S outage at the BUR Oyster Creek, 
essentially the entire core was sipped. Of the S16 EMC fuel 
asseablies in the core at that time, seven exhibited a sipping 
signal significantly above background. All seven asseablies 
were of the 7x7 type, and all but two had exceeded their 
warranted design burnup. 
An analysis of the power history of each esseably revealed 
that four of the seven failed asseablies had been subjected 
to an inward core location shuffle during a prior outage that 
resulted in a 20« violation of the fuel shuffling criteria. 
In a fifth failed assembly, a prior shuffling aoveaent had 
almost exceeded the saae shuffling criteria. 
In each cf the seven asseablies which failed to meet the 
sipping tests, a single, visibly failed fuel rod was located. 
In every case the failed fuel rod was located in the interior 
of the fuel bundle and was fabricated from thin-wall (0.90 
mm) cladding. Fuel rod fabrication from thick-walled (1.16 
mm) cladding showed no evidence of incipient failure. 
Fuel Performance in the Barsebeck Boiling Water Reactors 
(Unit 1 and 2), (Norman, Sydkraft) (B7) 
Operating recommendations preventing rapid power increases 
above a preconditioned power level have been in effect from 
the start of commercial operation for both units. These PCI-
rules are fairly similar to the GE PCIOMR's and restrict the 
local ramp rate to 0.2S kw/m*hr above 27 kW/m or the previous-
ly preconditioned power level. 
The local limitations have been translated to global operating 
rules. The core is assumed to be "unconditioned" after a control 
rod sequence exchange or a refuelling. During an unconditioned 
start-up the power is increased to 65% and then, after a 24 
hour waiting period, further increased with 2.St every four 
hours. Total time to reach full power will be about 3.5 days. 
B-9 
Both units have continuous motion screw-type control rod drives. 
The very small withdrawal increments possible with these drives 
allow control rods to be withdrawn at full power. The control 
rod step length is 2 cm when the new position is not pre-con-
ditioned, otherwise 4 cm. However, control rod withdrawal in 
repeated 2 cm steps every 4 hours, combined with the resultant 
local xenon transient, undoubtedly causes power ramps above 
the limit of 0.25 kW/m.hr (no actual figure is given). Start 
up after refuelling is another situation where the operating 
recommendations are exceeded. During the first steps of the 
power increase above 65%, local power increases exceed "by 
far" the target of 1 kW/m per 4 hour period (equivalent to 
0.25 kW/m.hr),(again no actual figure is given). 
Two cases of non-routine transients which caused "more severe" 
power shocks are described. In unit 1 a fast return to full 
power after a 10 hr period at 15% power caused excessive peaking 
in the bottom of the core. About 525 fuel rods with burnups 
above 10,000 MWD/tU, were ramped in their lower parts from 24 
±1 kW/m to 29 -1.5 kW/m. In unit 2 a turbine trip during 
startup caused a redistribution of power in the core. A detailed 
analysis of the behaviour of individual fuel elements shows that 
38 fuel assemblies with a burnup around 8,3000 MWD/tU were expo-
sed to a power shock of 13 kW/m from 23.5 kW/m to 36.5 kW/m. 
The power shocks were calculated for the peak rod in each 
assembly. The power ramp was terminated within 15 minutes 
by control rod insertion. No information is given on increased 
coolant activity resulting from these two transients, although 
it may be inferred that fuel failures have occurred. The gene-
ral fuel condition of the two cores is described as "near per-
fect" as judged from fis.«ion product activity in the coolant. 
Some information is presented regarding these activity levels, 
but no conversion to estimates of numbers of failed fuel rods 
is given. 
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Load Follow Capability of LWR Fuel - KWC Experience (von Jan 
et al., KWU) (BID 
The fuel behaviour during an increase of local power (q1) 
is strongly influenced by the preceding power history which 
determines the conditioned power of a fuel segment. Normally 
the conditioned power is the maximum steady state power in 
some burnup or time interval before the power increase. It 
is important to distinguish between power cycling (all power 
changes below the conditioned power) and power ramping (in-
crease beyond the conditioned power). The widely accepted 
features are 
(1) the existence of a design and burnup dependent 
PCI failure threshold q' , below of which ramps 
of any height and rate do not lead to failures, 
(ii) the need to limit either the ramp height or the 
ramp rate above q* if the conditioned power is 
exceeded, and 
(ill) the experience that power cycling within the con-
ditioned power does not lead to failures even above 
q' and with high power change rates. 
Present KWU PWR's are designed for fast load follow operation 
(5 - 10%/min) in a fully automated way. A combined power and 
power distribution control system based on fixed in-core de-
tectors limits local power and axial off-set. BWR's are also 
designed for fast load follow operation with 10%/min by rod 
control and up to 1%/sec by flow control. Fuel operating guide 
lines for KWU LWR's have no rate limitations for power cycling 
within set limits for the distortion of the power distribution. 
Partial rate limitations (5 X/h PWR's, 1 - 5 x/h BWR's) are re-
commended for the generic power ramp occurrences i.e. the start-
ups after (i) refuelling, (ii) extended part load operation, and 
(ill) control rod pattern exchanges in BWR's. 
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The fuel performance experience summarized in the following sections 
derives from a PHWR, a PWR and two BWR's with 7x7 fuel. 
PHWR^ The PHWR fuel is pre-pressurized, the fuel experience is, 
therefore, also considered of relevance to PWR's. The PHWR plant 
has been partly base-load operated and partly used for weekend 
load follow operation. About 80 power cycles up to 30 x P„ ampli-
tude have been accumulated. Fast power ramps occurred during the 
on-power refuelling. About 14000 rods with 3,000-4,500 MWD/tU local 
burnup have been ramped with &q*>10 kW/m and final powers up to 
53 kW/m steady state power not including transient increases by 
xenon or rod control. The extremely low failure rate of the fuel, 
about 0.01 X of the rods, demonstrates that there is no PCI problem 
inspite of the fact that according to the CANDU fuelograms a fai-
lure rate of several percents would be expected. 
PWR. PCI failures developed only in one instance in an older plant 
not equipped with the automatic control system. The cause was a 
strong distortion of axial power shape with M 0 X local transient 
power increase beyond steady state values. With the exception of 
this event, no PCI failures have been observed in KWU PWR's. 
Although most plants are base load operated, a substantial number 
of reactor power cycles has been accumulated by shutdown/start-ups 
or temporary load reductions for various reasons. The number of 
power cycles with amplitudes AP>10 % P„ from above to below 80 X 
P„, for instance, ranged up to 110 per operating cycle, and the 
number of start-ups to P>50 X P„ ranged up to 45 per operating 
cycle. Power increase rates of typically 1 - 5 X PN/min have been 
used. Frequency stabilization was successfully applied in one plant 
for about 1 month duration at 100 X power. 
One plant (20.6 kW/m average LHGR) performed scheduled part load 
operation towards the end of cycle 1 and power ramps back to high 
power in intervals <1 month with 1 - 2 X/min max. ramp rate at 
an average core burnup of 12-14,000 MWD/tU. High local power ramps 
occurred in all plants at BOC start-ups by fuel shuffling. 
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During plant maneuvers , transient increases beyond peak steady 
state powers are normally very small (^ 5 x) but occasionally reach 
10 - 15 X of the equilibrium value. However, the control system 
limits such ramps to some preset power density, e.g. to about 45 
kW/m at the beginning of an operating cycle. These data have to 
be compared to the PCI failure thresholds q' obtained for KWU PWR 
rods, i.e. 48 kW/m at 12,000 MND/tU and 42 kW/m at 23,000 MWD/tU 
local burnup. 
BWR 12*21;. Substantial power cycling experience has been accumula-
ted by shut-down/start-ups or temporary load reductions. Power 
increase rates of 1 - 2 x/min were normally applied. It is important 
to note that reactor power cycles in the range 30 - 100 X P„ did 
never produce failures. However, reactor start-ups at low or high 
xenon concentration did occasionally lead to failures if transient 
local power increases exceeded 15 X at powers P = 80 X P„. 
A strong xenon transient during a start-up mid-cycle 1 resulted 
in failures at ramp heights &q' exceeding 12 - 15 kW/m and at 
peak transient powers exceeding 45 - 50 kW/m, as is expected with 
low burnup rods. 
Start-ups after refuelling and control rod pattern exchange were 
done according to KWU recommendations. 3 X P«/h ramp rates from 
60 - 80 X P„ resulted in zero or <0.01 X failures. A 3 X P„/h 
ramp rate from 80 - 100 X after rod pattern exchange may have 
produced a few more failures. After more than 1 cycle operation 
at 75 - 80 x, fuel was ramped from 80 - 90 X and from 90 - 100 X 
with 1 X P,j/h ramp rate without failures. This shows that a 
ramp rate of 3 X P«/h might be acceptable below 80 X P„ (i.e. up 
to M 5 kW/m actual peak LH6R), but ramp rates <1 X P«/h should 
be used at generic ranp occurrences above 80 x P„ with BWR 7x7 fuel. 
i2_S22EiHSi22' analysis of plant manoeuvers at high power has 
shown that no failures occurred if the local power did not exceed 
the previous steady state distribution by more than a limited 
amount (typically 10 X). Regarding frequency stabilization, the 
overall experience indicates that power changes with high fre-
quency and small amplitude <5 x will not be a problem for LWR 
fuel. 
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PCI failures could vainly be attributed to severe fast local 
ramps with >30 X transient increase beyond the steady state 
power and beyond the failure threshold. Frost the start-up ex-
perience after refuelling and control rod pattern exchanges, 
it can be stated that careful start up with about 2 kW/m.h aax. 
ramp rate («3 - 5 X P«/h depending on peak LBGR) at high power 
up to near 45 kW/a peak LBGR did not lead to failures in pressu-
rized PNR fuel, and did not or only Marginally contribute to 
failures in unpressurixed BHR 7x7 fuel. This indicates that the 
KNU recommendations including a 5 X P^/h rate limitation in the 
high power range are safe for KHU PWR fuel, and should also be 
safe for pressurized KNU BUR 8x8 fuel with 44 - 45 kW/n peak 
design LHGR. 
Hioh Burnup Experience in PWR's (Leech et al., Westinghouse)(B12) 
Fuel performance experience is reported for region 3 in each of 
the two PHR's Zion-1 and Point Beach-2. Both regions had region 
average bumups greater than 36,000 MfD/tU «t the end of three 
cycles of operation. The peak assembly burnups were greater than 
39,000 MWD/tU and the peak rod burnups were greater than 42,000 
MWD/tU. 
Zion-1^ Region 3 has 13,056 fuel rods and operated mostly under 
base load conditions. The region average power varied due to 
fuel shuffling between cycles and was 17.7, 24.3, and 20.7 kW/m 
during cycles 1,2 and 3, respectively. The coolant activity 
levels were typical PWR operation. 
Results are given in some detail from TV examination of selec-
ted assemblies and non-destructive examination of removeable 
rods, including visual examination, plus length, profilometry 
and gamma scan measurements. Rod-to-rod channels were closed 
about half the value currently used in licensing. Most remove-
able rods had no significant clad ridging, although three rods 
had a few ridges of 75-100 pm height. The assemblies with 
these rods were sipped and found to contain no failed fuel. The 
maximum pellet-to-pellet gap was 7 mm. 
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Point_Beach-2. This ragion 3 has 7,160 rods with a nominal linear 
heat rating of IS.7 kW/m and operated onder load follow conditions. 
Daring three cycles of exposure, the region experienced S2t load 
follow cycles. A typical daily load follow was 100.70-100 with 
power increases of 0.3 - 0.1 x/min. The region experienced two 
reload start-ops and 13 shutdowns, with return to power frost 
shutdown at rates up to 30 - 50 %/hr. Coolant activity data showed 
that load follow and burnup had no significant effect on fuel 
integrity. 
Results are given from visual examination, crud sampling and 
leak testing of selected assemblies. The overall inspections 
showed that the fuel was in good condition, with no evidence of 
defected fuel rods. At the end of cycle 3, eight rod-to-rod 
channels were closed in excess of 90 % of the nominal value. 
Several of these rods appeared to be close to, or possibly in 
contact. The region 3 design has the fuel rods resting on the 
bottom assembly nozzle, whereas more recent designs have a clea-
rance between rods and nozzle leading to reduced bow. However, 
the region 3 data indicate that large amounts of rod bow did 
not lead to adverse fuel performance. 
$%V&T off PfH«*-Clfd Interaction Defectf jn Dresden-3 Fue\ Hods 
(Pasupathi et al., Battelle) (B15) 
During cycle-3 operation, fuel rod failures occurred during an 
inadvertent transient power increase caused b/ control rod move-
ments. In order to obtain data on PCI characteristecs, a detailed 
examination of a number of fuel rods was carried out. The paper 
summarizes the results which have been reported extensively else-
where (EPRI-NP-812). 
All the defects observed in this investigation came from failed 
fuel rods and were located mainly in the region of power transient 
(60 cm from the bottom of rods). The strongest eddy current sig-
nals occurred where the fuel had burnup in the range 7200 to 
11,300 MfD/tU and a power transient ranging up to 26 kw/m 
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to peak power of 34 kW/m. In rod KD-0451 no defects were found 
although it suffered a power transient ranging up to 35.4 kW/m; 
at the time of the event the average burnup in the rod was 
13,300 MWD/tU and the peak burnup was 17,700 MWD/tU. However, 
locally at 35 cm where the power transient was greatest, the 
burnup was quite low, only 5,600 MWD/tU. It appears that the 
ability of this particular fuel rod to withstand the large 
power transient can be directly correlated to the low burnup 
at that axial location. 
The pool-side examination included visual inspection, ultrasonic 
inspection for evidence of water in the fuel rod, and eddy-current 
inspection. Based on these examinations 10 rods were selected 
for further study. The rods selected had (a) no evidence of liquid 
phase water within them as seen by ultrasonic inspection, (b) eddy 
current indications (all rods but one) in the region of transient 
power increase, (c) no externally visible cause for the eddy current 
indications, and (d) a power history conducive to PCI. Nine of the 
ten rods selected contained eddy current indications. 
Profilometry showed that most of the rods contained localized 
areas of diameter increases. The presence of clad ridging was 
not obvious because of the surface irregularities due to crud or 
oxide layers. The eddy current tests indicated presence of possible 
internal fuel rod defects in all but one of the ten fuel rods. Most 
of the eddy current indications observed on the rods were located 
primarily near the bottom end which had experienced high power 
levels during the transient power increase. 
Five of the rods were punctured for fission gas analysis, inclu-
ding rod KD-0451 with no eddy-current indication. The fission 
gas data showed three of the rods to be definitely failed, one 
was probably failed and rod KD-0451 definitely unfailed. 
Two metallographic samples were taken from one of the failed rods, 
one at the location of a strong eddy current indication and another 
at the location of a weak indication. The results showed that the 
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strong indication was associated with a through-wall, SCC-type 
crack and the weak indication with some hydriding and a cluster 
of cracks in the hydrided region. SEM fractography of cladding 
samples also gave evidence of stress-corrosion cracking. 
FCI-Remedy Development for the Fuel Performance Improvement 
Program (Freshley et al., Battelle etc.) (B17) 
The program's objective is to remove constraints on power ma-
neuvering capability caused by the fuel-cladding interaction 
(FCI) phenomenon. 
Annular-coated-pressurized and sphere-pac fuel designs are being 
developed as possible FCI remedies for LHR application. The ex-
pected improved FCI behaviour of these fuel types is based on 
their design characteristics which result in a combination of 
reduced local and/or general stress/strain in the cladding; 
lower fuel temperatures and reduced fission product release; 
graphite coating on the inside cladding surface to reduce fric-
tion between fuel and cladding and/or interact with the active 
fission products to retard Zircaloy stress-corrosion-cracking 
(SCO; and helium pressurization to retard cladding creep down 
and improve thermal performance. 
The effectiveness of these remedies will be evaluated in ramp 
tests of rods being irradiated in the Halden and Big Rock Point 
reactors. 
Mechanistic Studies of Power Ramping Defects (Wood et al., AECL) 
(B18) 
An indirect estimate is made of the relative coefficients of 
friction between Zircaloy cladding and U02 pellets that had 
prevailed in-reactor, with and without graphite and siloxane 
CANLUB interlayers. The number of peripherical radial cracks 
were counted from metallographic cross-sections and plotted 
against the ramped powers experienced by the fuel pins towards 
the ends of their irradiation histories. Graphite lubricated 
CANLUB fuel averaged significantly fewer peripheral cracks 
than uncoated fuel. Using these observations with an equation 
by Rolstad, it was deduced that the ratio of friction coeffici-
ents (CANLUB graphite: bare Zircaloy) had been 0.57:1.00 in-reac-
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tor. By contrast, the data points with siloxane CANLUB fuel 
indicated that siloxane did not act as a lubricant in-service. 
Even though graphite reduced the friction coefficient in-reactor, 
the increased circumferential length of the fuel segments (caused 
by fewer U0_ cracks) had a compensating effect on the stress 
concentration in the cladding, and it is deduced for CANDU fuel 
that graphite has a very marginal effect on the stress inten-
sity in the cladding. 
The defect threshold for Pickering fuel is sharply defined at 
46 kW/m and fission gas release also increases sharply at the 
same linear power. Assuming the corrodent species to be released 
in about the same proportion as xenon, it is suggested that the 
threshold power is closely related to fission product availability. 
Conversely AP is believed to be related to clad stress. 
Assuming the above arguments to be correct it would have been 
expected that a 5 x reduction in stress intensity would raise 
the AP threshold for CANLUB graphite coated fuel by 100 % or 
more relative to fuel clad with bare Zircaloy in NRU fuel ramping 
tests. However, the concurrent increase, due to graphite CANLUB 
in the power threshold which amounted to about 15 kW/m may have 
played a dominant role in preventing defects - thus making a 
very limited improvement in AP threshold. This conclusion is 
reinforced by the excellent performance of siloxane CANLUB fuel 
in which stress corrosion cracking type defects have never been 
encountered. (In one test the fuel was ramped inadvertently into 
central melting and the clad sheared due to mechanical overload.) 
The results indicate that siloxane CANLUB fuel can tolerate even 
higher powers and power increases than graphite CANLUB though 
it was deduced earlier that the irradiated siloxane does not act 
as a lubricant in-service. 
The beneficial effects of graphite may well have stemmed mainly 
from absorption or adsorption of fission products or merely the 
provision of a barrier to prevent harmful species from reaching 
the inside surface of the cladding. Similarly, since siloxane 
does not act as a lubricant in-service, it is deduced that the 
excellent performance of siloxane CANLUB fuel was due to inter-
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action with fission products and also an inherent increased re-
sistance to SCO of the siloxane coated cladding by virtue of 
the hydrogen metered into the clad wall during irradiation. 
Nuclear Fuel Rod Behaviour During LOFT Experiment L2-2 
(Tolman et al., EG&G Idaho) (B19) 
The Loss-Of-Fluid Test (LOFT) reactor has been scaled to simulate 
the thermal-hydraulic characteristics of a large PNR under Loss-
Of -Coolant (LOCA) conditions. The core consists of 1300 fuel rods 
of nominal PWR design except for length (1.67 m) and internal 
pressurizaticn (1 atm.). Approximately 200 thermocouples measure 
the fuel rod cladding temperature in six of the nine fuel modules. 
In the first nuclear experiment, LOCE L2-2, the maximum linear 
heat load just prior to the transient was 26.4 kW/m. Initial 
departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) generally occurred between 
1.5 and 2.0 s. After DNB, the cladding temperature increased 
rapidly until approximately 2.5 s, after which the cladding tem-
perature rise was limited ard increased only slightly over the 
next 2 to 3 s. The measured peak cladding temperature in the 
core was 780K. A core wide rewet and cladding temperature quench 
was observed between 6.5 and 7.5 s and progressed from the bottom 
to top of the core. The cladding temperature remained quenched 
for approximately 4 to 8 s (depending on thermocouple location), 
after which the centermodule and higher power peripheral module 
fuel rods showed secondary DNB and increasing cladding tempera-
tures, not exceeding 660 K. Subsequent rewets and cladding dry-
outs occurred between 20 and 35 s. Finally, the reactor core 
was cooled by ECC water between 35 and 45 s. 
Best-estimate pretest calculations gave a maximum cladding 
temperature just below 1000 K, i.e. about 200 K higher than the 
maximum measured level during the test. Because of this large 
difference between pretest calculations and measured cladding 
temperatures, an important issue is the accuracy and potential 
selective cooling effects of the LOFT surface thermocouples. 
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Out-of-pile tests to evaluate the accuracy of LOFT thermocouples 
by comparison with measurements from small embedded thermocouples 
near the cladding surface have shown the accuracy to be within 
-20 K for blowdown and reflood LOCE conditions. Comparison of 
measured ECC core reflooding rates between LOCE L2-2 and a 
similar cold leg break, zero-power LOCE Ll-5, show no measurable 
difference. It is inferred that the uninstrumented rods behaved 
similar to the rods with cladding thermocouples. 
The activity level of the primary coolant indicated that no fuel 
rod failing occurred during the test. 
Damage and Failure of Unirradiated and Irradiated Fuel Rods 
Tested Under Film Boiling Conditions (Mehner et al., EG&G Idaho) 
(B22) 
A number of hypothesized accidents must bi- considered in the 
design and licensing of LWR's. These include various off-normal 
power or cooling conditions, generally termed power-cooling-
mismatch (PCM) accidents because of failure of the coolant to 
successfully remove the heat generated within the core. 
If departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) occurs during a PCM 
event, fuel rod damage may occur. Current licensing criteria 
dictate that if a rod is postulated to have exceeded DNB ratio 
limits, the rod is assumed to have failed. However, fuel rods 
can operate in film boiling and incur significant damage before 
failure actually occurs. 
PCM experiments are being conducted in the Power Burst Facility 
(PBF) at Idaho, to evaluate the behaviour of unirradiated and 
irradiated LWR fuel rods tested under film boiling conditions. 
To date, 22 unirradiated, 9 previously irradiated and 7 fuel 
rods built with irradiated cladding and fresh fuel have been 
tested. This paper summarizes the results from these in-pile 
tests, with emphasis on the damage incurred by the cladding and 
fuel during film boiling. The tests were performed using pressu-
rized water reactor (PWR) type fuel rods, about 0.97 m long. The 
rods were tested singly or four at a time in the PBF in-pile 
test loop, with coolant temperatures and pressures typical of 
a PWR environment. Film boiling conditions were established 
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by either reducing coolant flow while maintaining constant rod 
power, or increasing rod power while maintaining constant coolant 
flow. The rods were operated under stable film boiling conditions 
from 30 seconds up to about 12 minutes with, depending on the test, 
fuel rod peak powers ranging from about 50 to 78 kW/m. Film boi-
ling operation was terminated by either increasing flow or rapid-
ly reducing fuel rod power. 
Cladding Damage. Film boiling results in high cladding tempera-
tures. As a result of the loss of cladding strength at the high 
temperatures and the differential between the system pressure 
and the rod internal pressure (typically 7 MPa), the cladding 
co2lapses onto the fuel and flows into irregularities in the 
fuel column. The reduction in diameter within the film boiling 
zone is usually fairly uniform. The onset of uniform cladding 
collapse and waisting (clad collapse into pellet interfaces) 
has been found to coincide with the recrystallization process 
in cold worked, stress relieved Zircaloy, which occurs at tem-
peratures of about 920 K. Cladding having prior irradiation (up 
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to 1.4 x 10 neutron/cm ) behaved similarly to unirradiated 
cladding. The irradiation damage is apparently annealed out 
during the temperature transient prior to cladding collapse. 
The cladding at the elevated temperatures has sufficient duc-
tility to accommodate the collapse and waisting strains and no 
failures have been detected even when up to 50 % wall thinning 
has occurred. As a result of the high cladding temperatures, the 
cladding reacts with the coolant to produce the characteristic 
brittle oxide and oxygen-stabilized alpha layers at the outer 
surface of the cladding. 
The collapse of the cladding onto the fuel column in the film 
boiling zone produces intimate contact between the cladding and 
the fuel. The chemical reaction which occurs between the two 
materials becomes significant at temperatures above 1100 K. In 
this reaction the U02 fuel is reduced and oxygen diffuses into 
the cladding, forming an oxygen-stabilized alpha layer which 
embrittles the cladding in a manner similar to the cladding-
coolant reaction at the outer surface of the cladding. In addition, 
a duplex reaction layer has often been observed between the 
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cladding and fuel in previously unirradiated rods. 
A small amount of hydrogen pickup occurred in the film boiling 
zones of rods which were intact prior to and during film boi-
ling operations. Hydrides were generally dispersed in the cladding 
wall and no adverse effects on cladding ductility or fuel rod 
behaviour were detected. However, three rods which were operated 
in film boiling with failed cladding were embrittled at room 
temperature to a greater extent than intact rods oxidized under 
similar conditions. 
Fuel_Damage. Following DNB, fuel temperatures within the film 
boiling zone rise quickly. These high temperatures result in 
changes in the fuel which can affect fuel rod behaviour. For 
high-powered rods (> 50 kW/m), fuel melting frequently occurs 
at the center of the pellets. Grain boundary separation has been 
observed in fuel from the film boiling zone of both unirradiated 
and irradiated fuel rods. The shattered fuel is in a powdered 
condition and has somtimes washed out of failed fuel rods. 
Fuel rod swelling has been observed in the film boiling zones 
of both previously unirradiated and previously irradiated fuel 
rods. In Unirradiated rods the swelling was caused by pellet 
thermal expansion and pellet volume expansion due to fuel melting. 
The swelling in irradiated rods was generally greater (3 to 4 X), 
compared with unirradiated rods (< 1 %). Only about half of the 
swelling is due to pellet thermal expansion and pellet volume 
expansion due to fuel melting. The remaining expansion is attri-
buted primarily to fission gas effects. A small part of the ex-
pansion was attributed to fission-gas bubble migration to grain 
boundaries. However, the major contribution was concluded to be 
caused by fission gas bubbles trapped in the molten fuel. The 
molten fuel appears to act as an effective containment for the 
gases, sealing cracks and preventing escape of the gases to the 
rod plenum. The fission gas bubbles expand due to changes in 
surface tension and agglomeration, thereby pressurizing the molten 
fuel core. As bubbles continue to agglomerate, significant hydro-
static pressures may build up and cause fuel rod swelling and 
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molten-fuel extrusion. These fission gas effects produced no 
significant adverse behaviour in test rods with burnups up to 
17,000 MWD/tU. 
Rods have been operated in film boiling with up to 80 * of the 
pellet radius molten. The molten fuel is generally contained 
at the center of the pellet; however, molten fuel extrusion 
into pellet interfaces, gaps in the fuel column and radial 
cracks in the outer layer of the fuel pellet has been observed. 
Fuel Rod Failure. In the PBF tests two previously failed fuel 
rods were operated in film boiling, two rods failed during film 
boiling operation, and nine rods fractured following film boi-
ling operation. 
Rods with defects similar to a hydride rupture outside the film 
boiling zone and pinhole-type or small axial crack-type defects 
behave similarly to intact fuel rods when operated for short 
times in film boiling. The significant adverse effects detected 
were ficsion product release from the failed rods and enhanced 
pickup of hydrogen by the cladding due to the stagnant steam 
inside the rod, which affects the cladding embrittlement at 
roc.n temperature. 
It was concluded that a fuel rod, operated in film boiling until 
failure occurred due to cladding oxidation, did not fail until 
the cladding was totally oxidized to ZrO. and oxygen-stabi-
lized alpha with an equivalent cladding reacted value of about 
24 X. Rod failure due to oxygen embrittlement was found to be 
consistent with room temperature embrittlement criteria based on 
oxygen content in the beta Zircaloy, rather than embrittlement 
criteria based on the fractional thickness of transformed beta-
phase or equivalent cladding reacted. 
The cladding on rods that failed (breached) prior to or during 
film boiling was embrittled to a greater extent than intact rods 
oxidized under similar conditions and fractured during posttest 
handling. This additional embrittlement appeared to be associated 
with enhanced hydrogen absorption from the stagnant steam inside 
the breached rods. The hydrogen appears to affect the prior beta-
phase material, resulting in room temperature embrittlement with 
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cladding hydrogen concentrations as low as about 300 ppm. 
Cladding melting has not occurred in the PBF tests where molten 
fuel has contacted the cladding. 
Light Water Reactor Fuel Response Purina Reactivity Initiated 
Accident Experiments (MacDonald et al., EG*G Idaho) (B23) 
The rapid, inadvertent insertion of reactivity into a LWR core 
(by control rod ejection) is a potential mechanism for fuel rod 
failure. Much of the reactivity initiated accident (RIA) experi-
mental data were obtained several years ago in the SPERT (Capsule 
Driver Core) and TREAT test programs, which investigated the be-
haviour of single or small clusters of fuel rods under near room 
temperature and atmospheric (or near atmospheric) pressure condi-
tions, no forced coolant flow, and zero initial power. Similar 
tests have been performed in the Japanese Nuclear Safety Research 
Reactor (NSRR). Energy deposition, and consequent enthalpy increase, 
in the test fuel was the single most important independent variable. 
The threshold for failure of unirradiated fuel was generally about 
240 to 265 cal/g UO_, and was relatively insensitive to cladding 
material, cladding heat treatment, fuel form, fuel material, and 
gap width. Metal-water reaction was first detectable at about 
200 cal/g U02 and increased to about 50 X of the cladding wall 
thickness at 500 cal/g UO_. 
A new RIA fuel behaviour experimental program was recently started 
in the Power Burst Facility (PBF) with coolant conditions typi-
cal of hot-startup conditions in a commercial boiling water reac-
tor (BWR). To date, six tests have been completed: four single 
rod scoping tests (Tests RIA ST-1, RIA ST-2, RIA ST-3, and RIA 
ST-4) with radial average energy depositions ranging from about 
220 to 560 cal/g U02 and two four-rod tests (RIA 1-1 and RIA 1-2) 
with energy depositions of approximately 320 and 200 cal/g U0_, 
respectively. 
The four RIA scoping test rods were fabricated with unirradiated 
cladding, fresh fuel pellets and dimensions typical of pressuri-
zed water reactor (PWR) fuel. Two fuel rods previously irradiated 
in the Saxton reactor to approximately 4,600 MWD/tU burnup and two 
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unirradiated Saxton rods were used in the RIA 1-1 test and four 
previously irradiated Saxton fuel rods were used in the RIA 1-2 
test. One of the RIA 1-1 previously irradiated fuel rods was 
backfilled with a mixture of helium and argon to 0.1 MPa. The 
other RIA 1-1 previously irradiated fuel rod was unopened prior 
to testing. Based on measurements of similar rods, the internal 
gas pressure of helium and fission gases was about 0.1 MPa. The 
two unirradiated RIA 1-1 fuel rods were backfilled with helium 
to 0.1 MPa. Two of the RIA 1-2 previously irradiated fuel rods 
were backfilled with a mixture of helium and argon to 2.4 MPa, 
a third rod was backfilled with the same mixture of gases to 
0.1 MPa. and the fourth rod was unopened prior to testing. Each 
0.91 m long test rod was surrounded by a separate flow shroud. 
As observed in the previous SPERT, TREAT and NSRR tests, energy 
deposition, (thus consequent enthalpy increase) in the test fuel 
appears to be the single most important variable. The threshold 
for failure of unirradiated fuel subjected to an RIA under boi-
ling water reactor hot-startup system conditions is about the 
same as was observed in SPERT and NSRR. In PBF, unirradiated 
rod failures occurred at about 270 cal/g UO- and above and did 
not occur at 230 cal/g U0-. However, the consequences of pre-
viously unirradiated fuel rod failure at boiling water reactor 
hot-startup system conditions appears to be more severe than 
observed in either SPERT or NSRR. Extensive cracking and crumb-
ling of embrittled cladding and fuel occurred during the PBF 
tests, presumably during cooldown. 
A cross section of the previously unirradiated rod RIA ST-1 
(280 cal/g UO,) revealed rod deformation, cladding fracture 
and fuel loss. The rod was no longer circular and had regions 
of cladding thickening and thinning amounting to approximately 
170 and 60 X of the original wall thickness, respectively. The 
cladding was heavily and uniformly oxidized around the circum-
ference from both the U02-Zircaloy reaction on the cladding 
inside surface and the Zircaloy-water reaction on the outside 
surface. In regions where the cladding had thinned, the oxida-
tion had consumed all of the prior beta material, leaving only 
brittle ZrO, and oxygen stabilized alpha. The rod apparently 
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fractured upon being quenched. These cladding structures 
(along with cladding temperature and coolant pressure measure-
ments) suggest the following scenario: during the power burst 
the fuel expands out against the cladding; film boiling heat 
transfer is initiated and the cladding temperatures reach 
values near the melting point; rapid heat transfer to the 
coolant results in vaporization and a modest pressure pulse 
(- 2 MPa) which acts on the ductile cladding to deform it 
into thin and thick regions; the fuel rod cladding remains 
in film boiling for about 20 seconds during which the cladding 
reacts with both the fuel and coolant (steam) and becomes 
heavily oxidized; and, finally, rod fracture occurs upon 
quench. 
The fuel structure of rod RIA ST-1 exhibited grain growth 
and extensive grain boundary separation. There was no evi-
dence of fuel melting. A considerable amount of powdered fuel 
was missing and presumably was subsequently washed out of the 
rod. 
The two previously irradiated Saxton fuel rods tested during 
the RIA 1-1 experiment exhibited even more unusual behaviour. 
Complete flow blockage of the shroud coolant occurred within 
4 s after the power burst. Approximately half of those rods 
(subjected to an energy deposition of about 320 cal/g U02), 
disintegrated into either fine fuel powder or larger chunks of 
fuel and cladding. In addition, portions of the rod swelled 
and blocked about 80 % of the flow channel. The remaining 
approximately 20 % of the flow channel was blocked by debris 
(powdered fuel). The disintegration of a significant portion 
of the unirradiated RIA ST-2 and RIA 1-1 test rods did not 
completely block their coolant channels. 
The four previously irradiated Saxton fuel rods tested during 
the RIA 1-2 test were subjected to a peak energy deposition 
of approximately 200 cal/g UO.. One of the two unpressurized 
RIA 1-2 rods (a rod which was not opened) remained relatively 
intact but failed. This rod was found to have twenty-two longi-
tudinal cracks starting at about 18 cm and extending to about 
B-26 
72 cm from the bottom of the 91-cm fuel stack. The cracks had 
the appearance of stress-corrosion type cracks. The total pellet 
energy at the 18- and 72-cm locations was about 150 cal/g UO--
Thus it is tentatively concluded that the failure threshold 
during an RIA event starting from hot-startup for fuel rods 
with burnups of about 5,000 MWD/tU is approximately 150 cal/g 
UO_ conditions. 
The other RIA 1-2 unpressurized rod (which had been opened to 
insert a plenum pressure transducer) did not fail. The two pre-
pressurized rods (2.4 MPa) also did not fail but did experience 
cladding ballooning with a volume increase of approximately 20 X. 
These results suggest that previously irradiated Zircaloy cladding 
(which has experienced fast neutron damage) is susceptible to 
something similar to stress corrosion cracking due to pellet-
cladding interaction (PCI) when the fission product chemistry 
remains undisturbed. Prepressurezation of the previously irra-
diated Saxton rods probably provided a cushion between the fuel 
and cladding and lowered the strain rate and opening of the 
rods probably also changed the fission product chemistry and 
thereby decreased the propensity for PCI failure during an RIA. 
PWR Type Overpower Tasts at 1620 GJ/kqU (18,800 MWD/tU) 
(Knudsen et al., Risø) (B28) 
These short PWR type test fuel pins (of 15x15 geometry) accumu-
lated a burnup of 18,800 MWD/tU at heat loads decreasing from 
45 to 28 kW/m. A fast power ramp was then applied to one pin 
up to 43 kW/m and after 3/4 hours further to 45 kW/m; this level 
was maintained for 523 hours without failure indication. The 
other two pins were ramped to 49 kW/m and both failed after max. 
6 minutes. 
The intact pin exhibited a high fission gas release of 42 2. 
The cladding penetrations of the two failed pins (with the 
short hold time) were so small that significant amounts of 
fission gas and helium fill gas were retained in the pins; 
this permitted estimation of fission gas releases of 12 and 
18 X respectively. 
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SCC type cladding cracks in one of the failed pins were extreme-
ly narrow and axially very short, only a few wall thicknesses 
in length at the inner surface and much less at the outer sur-
face penetration. Various small cracks were also seen in this 
pin, whereas the intact fuel pin showed no sign of such cladding 
cracks. 
The observations on fission gas release, fuel structure and 
cladding and fuel deformations indicate that the long hold-
time for the intact fuel pin permitted the operation of diffu-
sion and creep processes inspite of the lower over-power level. 
Power Ramp Tests of Potential PCI Remedies (Davies et al., GE) 
(B29) 
Two types of power ramp tests have been used to determine the 
effectiveness of potential pellet-cladding interaction (PCI) 
remedies. In the first test, fuel rods were incubated in a test 
reactor to 4,500 MWD/tU prior to ramping. This test is expensive, 
but it can be performed in a relatively short time. In the second 
test, the fuel rods were incubated in a power reactor to 9,000 MHD/tU. 
This is less expensive but design and licensing are time consuming, 
and shipping to the test reactor (for ramping) is tied to reactor 
schedules. In both test types, ramping was performed in a test 
reactor, using stepwize power increases up to a maximum power 
level of 60 kW/m. 
The experimental variables .included several kinds of barriers 
(at the inner clad surface), pellet geometry, hollow pallets and 
powder fuel, but the main objective was to determine the ramp 
test performance of Cu-barrier and Zr-liner fuel relative to 
reference designs. The thickness of the Cu-barrier was chosen 
to be 10 urn,based on the range of fission fragments in Cu. How-
ever, good results have also been obtained with 5 pm Cu. The Zr-
liner cladding is fabricated by co-extrusion and co-reduction. 
The pure Zr-liner on the cladding inner surface is about 7 5 um 
thick. 
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In tests of the first type, the following results were obtained: 
Various reference rods t/9 failed 
Cu-barrier 7/7 sound 
Zr-liner 2/2 sound 
Other remedies 10/12 failed. 
Tests with power reactor incubation resulted in this: 
Reference rods 3/3 failed 
Cu-barrier 3/3 sound 
Zr-liner 3/3 sound. 
It is seen that the cu-barrier and Zr-liner rod designs had 
a substantial performance advantage over standard designs with 
unmodified Zircaloy cladding. 
Typical PCI cracks were located in the failed rods; also, soae 
incipient cracks were found in a sound reference rod which had 
experienced a aaxiana peak power of 49 kM/a. Mo incipient cracks 
were discovered in any of the Cu-barrier or Zr-liner rods. In 
the Cu-barrier rods the general coverage, uniformity and adhe-
rence of the copper layer remained excellent after 9,000 ir-fD/tU 
exposure. Features deviating froa the typical appearance, in-
cluding gouges and saall local separations from the cladding, 
were rare observations. Embedded fuel particles in the copper 
layer were relatively common, but apparently did not degrade 
its protective qualities. Another observation was the formation 
of a thin (M..2 um) Cu-Zr interaetallic layer between the barrier 
and the cladding during service. Examinations of the Zr-liner 
rods confirmed the integrity and uniformity of the pure zirco-
nium liners, although the inside surface finish was somewhat 
rougher than for stvd*rd cladding. 
The Studsvik Inter-Ramo Project. An International Power Ramp 
Experimental Study. (Nogard et al., Studsvik) (B30) 
Twenty 8x8 type BWR test fuel rods were base irradiated to 
burnup levels of 10,000 or 20,000 MND/tU and then ramp tested at 4 
kW/m.min. to preset terminal power levels, held for 24 hours 
or until failure indication. A cyclic power pattern was used 
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in the base irradiation to simulate the duty cycle of fuel rods 
sitting close to control rod positions in a power reactor; po-
wer levels alternated between about 40 and 25 kW/m, with 65-
70 days at each level. The majority of the rods were of the 
same design (with 0.15 mm gap). Two clad heat treatments (re-
crystallized and cold-worked/stress-relieved) were included 
as well as a few variations of gap size and one low pellet den-
sity. 
Power ramp failures developed above about 42 kW/m and there 
appeared to be a failure threshold about 8 kW/m above the previ-
ous low power operating level. The failure threshold appears 
to be sharply defined and there is no indication of a burnup 
dependence. There is no information regarding the influence 
of cladding heat treatment and small gaps (0.08 mm). Two rods 
which were classified as non-leakers proved to contain incipient 
(non-penetrating) SCC defects; the terminal power levels were 
41 and 48 kW/m, respectively. Two other rods without failure 
indication during the ramp test proved to have failed at 48 
kW/m (25 min. hold time) and 51 kW/m; the latter was the only 
large gap rod (0.25 mm) and was dropped accidentally during 
handling in the pool. 
Above a ramp terminal power level of 42 kW/m, the transient 
fission gas release increased steeply from a low value of 
about 3 % to a value of about 25 % at 51 kW/m. The failed 
large-gap rod seemed to have retained all its fission gases. 
Panel Discussion: Fuel Performance - What Next ? 
The Portland meeting was concluded with a panel discussion on 
"Fuel Performance - what Next ?", i.e. on the foreseen develop-
ments related to fuel performance in general. The introductory 
contributions of the panel members are summarized below, inclu-
ding information given in replies during the subsequent (rather 
brief) discussion. There were no written versions available 
of the contributions; the following sections are based on the 
author's notes. In order to avoid "distortion" of the general 
impression of this concluding session, it has been attempted to 
give a comprehensive summary, rather than extracting the notes 
of direct relevance to the more limited subject of the present 
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review. 
J.R. Tomonto (Florida Power & Light): Few if any utilities 
will order nuclear power plants in the near future (perhaps 
for, say 7-8 years); new orders will require changes in the 
licensing process and in the public attitude. Fuel must be 
able to reach 40-50,000 MWD/tU routinely, instead of the 
present levels around 30,000 MWD/tU; the capability to with-
stand transients is important in fuel development. Some of 
the current concepts of solutions to the PCI problem may wort 
but they are "a blacksmith's nightmare" and will require in-
creased emphasis on quality assurance and control. It will be 
necessary to make plant operators increasingly aware of the 
possible consequences of anticipated plant maneuvers, and 
furhter development of on-line computerization is foreseen. 
R.O. Meyer (USNRC); In the licensing process, the objectives 
of the fuel system review is to ensure that: (i) the fuel 
system is not damaged during normal operation and anticipated 
operational occurrences, (ii) fuel system damage is never so 
severe as to prevent control rod insertion, (iii) the number of 
fuel rod failures is not underestimated for postulated accidents, 
(ir) coolability is always maintained. To satisfy these objec-
tives, acceptance criteria are needed for fuel system damage, 
fuel rod failure, and fuel coolability. These criteria are 
discussed in detail in the Standard Review Plan. In licensing, 
not much attention is given to normal operation except as a 
starting point of an accident. Thus fission gas release is im-
portant at the beginning of a loss-of-coolant accident, i.e. 
there is interest in modelling capability at relatively high 
heat ratings, say 50 kW/m, rather than at the more usual 20-23 
kW/m . it was considered that the ANS-5,4 fission gas release 
model (described during the meeting) was a possibility for im-
provement of existing codes in the low temperature regime. In-
formation is required on the effect of PCI on failure criteria 
in (off-normal) events; there is an immediate need in the licen-
sing procedure for a PCI failure predicting model. Commenting 
on the condition of the Three Mile Island (TMI) core, it was 
estimated that about 40 X of the Zr in the active part of the 
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core is oxidized (based on the amount of hydrogen produced); it 
is assumed that the oxidation is "localized" in the middle of 
the core with perhaps 1-lJj m of fuel (rods) oxidized. 
P.M. Lang (USDOE); DOE has two objectives in the fuel perfor-
mance area: (a) Improved uranium utilization, (b) increased 
productivity. Current fuel (with significant exposure) was de-
signed many years ago and differs from modern design, e.g. be-
cause a once-thru cycle is now to be used rather than a fuel 
cycle with reprocessing. Reversal to reprocessing necessitates 
government and industry decisions, as well as changes in de-
sign, licensing, manufacture and operation; it was thus consi-
dered that it will continue to be the once-thru-cycle for the 
foreseeable future. Increases in cost of yellow cake and en-
richment are incentives to review fuel designs that were defined 
years ago. Increase of discharge burnup is seen as the single 
large, near-term item to increase uranium utilization; if 
40-50,000 MWD/tU can be achieved, then the uranium feed re-
quirements are reduced by 10-20 * and the fuel cycle cost de-
creased moderately. Four subject areas for fuel performance deve-
lopments are: (i) higher burnup (emphasis on fission gas space, 
burnable poison, PCI remedies), (ii) wetter lattices (smaller 
rods, annular pellets), (iii) blankets (natural or depleted, 
utilizing in-site burning of generated Pu), (iv) 18 months' 
cycles. 
J.T.A. Roberts (EPRI): In the area of fuel safety, a concerted 
effort is required from industry, research and government to 
determine what happened at TMI and to improve models etc. to 
predict/analyze such occurrences. Commenting on the TMI core, 
it is considered that a significant number of fuel rods are 
perforated and the cladding embrittled, with significant debris 
at the core bottom; it will probably be (at least) 12 months 
before one can think of opening the pressure vessel. Regarding 
fuel reliability, EPRI studies show an improvement of 6 Si in 
plant availability over the last two years; much of this is 
fuel-related (e.g. shorter refuelling; revision of PCIOMR's, 
"pre-conditioning interim operating management recommendations"). 
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In order to improve plant capacity and flexibility further, 
it is desireable to develop "no-capacity-loss fuel". Changes 
proposed in this direction were: (a) for PWR's: shorter, annu-
lar pellets with a large grain size, emphasis on water side 
corrosion aspects, (b) for BWR*s: pre-pressurization (has been 
introduced), barrier fuel concepts (perhaps only needed for 
fuel in high duty positions, e.g. load following), (c) opera-
tion: continuous monitoring of core physics and mechanical fuel 
performance. 
R.N. Duncan (CE): Present discharge targets were set 5-10 years 
ago. Fuel performance is good and is still improving. The true 
limits of UOj-Zr fuel have not yet been found. Recognized per-
formance limits are: cracking of austenitic stainless steel cladding 
in BWR's, and perforation of Zr cladding,due to PCI, in LWR's 
after power changes. Development aspects for PWR's for the next 
five years were summarized. New discharge targets are at 46,000 
MMD/tU and involves four 12-month cycles or three 18-months 
cycles. This extended burnup requires special attention to: PCI, 
waterside corrosion, fuel assembly dimensional changes, fission 
gas release, burnable poison materials. New shuffling patterns 
may be required that involve (i) increased handling during shut-
downs, (ii) different operating histories that may affect PCI 
performance. Possible fuel modifications are: (a) annular pellets 
of lower density, (b) pore size control, to control densification, 
(c) additives to increase fuel plasticity, (d) large grain size 
to improve fission gas retention. 
J.S. Arntijo (GE): Near-term improvements are related to fuel 
performance in several areas: 
(a) reduction of the impact of PCIOMR's, by: 
- increase of ramp rate in 1978, with more improvement to 
come; 
- pre-pressurization of fuel rods with 3 at. He was intro-
duced in 1979? 
- changes in procedure and use of process computers have 
simplified the implementation of PCIOMR's; load-follow 
fully with PCIOMR's was demonstrated in 1978; 
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- introduction of the "control cell core" concept, where 
most of the control blades are out the core, only about 
25 % (which are surrounded by low power fuel assemblies) 
are used for control, and there are no sequence changes 
during the cycle; 
(b) introduction of two concepts of PCI resistant fuel: Cu-barrier 
and Zr liner, which are now ready for large-scale demonstra-
tion; it is considered that the extra cost of fabrication 
may be acceptable with the increasing cost of uranium and 
enrichment; 
(c) improved uranium utilization, using: 
- blankets and improved refuelling patterns; 
- EOC feedwater temperature reduction; 
- burnup optimization; 
- discharging/reassembling of high enrichment fuel rods; 
- reduced fuel density and lattice optimization; 
- spectral shift (coolant density); 
- once-thru Th cycle; 
- boric acid for cold shutdown (because of the higher en-
richments required for extended burnup). 
Overall savings of 22-48 % are predicted from these improvements. 
R. Holzer (KWU): Important aspects of KWU fuel performance ex-
perience were summarized. Rod bow is not significant due to mini-
mized clad/spacer interaction. Fission gas release is max. 10 % 
in BWR's and max. 4 % in PWR's, with a weak burnup dependence. 
EOL clad creepdown is about 0.75 %. Waterside corrosion is not 
clearly explained for PWR's; nodular corrosion is experienced 
in BWR's but with no consequences. Power cycling will become 
more important. Max. ramp terminal levels {presumably for pre-
pressurized PWR rods) for fast ramps are 48 kw/m in the first 
cycle and 42 kw/m in the second cycle; these limits may be 
safely exceeded with modified ramps (lower ramp rate when approa-
ching terminal level). In order to extend burnup to, say, 55,000 MWD/ 
tu , high priority is given to: (a) PCI experiments (although no 
severe changes are expected), (b) waterside corrosion. The folio-
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wing subject areas are OK, or solutions are known: 
- U0- dimensional stability: codes OK, pore optimization 
possible; 
- fission gas release: codes about OK (also for transients), 
larger plenum volume possible; 
- clad creep and growth: OK; 
- spring forces: springs are in low flux; 
- rod bow: not seen in KWU fuel, but may become more impor-
tant with smaller rod diameter. 
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Review of Papers 
Load Follow Operation in Nuclear Power Plants and its Influence 
on PWR Fuel Behaviour (Nagino et al., Kansai Electric Power) (C2) 
As of September 1978, Kansai had five PWR's in operation, 
and the fuel operating experience included 1534 fuel assemblies, 
1099 of which were discharged. There have been a total of 19 
leakers and most of these were hydriding failures from excessive 
pellet moisture. The present very low failure rate is seen as 
a combined result of design and manufacturing improvements and 
restrictions on rate of power change. 
Currently, a nuclear power plant is operated, as a general rule, 
in base load. As nuclear power plants of greater capacity go 
into operation, their share in the total power generation gets 
greater. To maintain operational flexibility, several changes 
in the present mode of operation become necessary as discussed 
below. The main concern regarding fuel performance is then the 
effect on fuel rod integrity of rapid power increase and power 
change rate, primarily caused by PCI. 
(a) Relaxation of limit on Rate of Power Increase: The PWR 
plants now in operation were designed to respond to the 
load changes, -5 %/min in the ramp-wise and -10 % in the 
step-wise. In order to reduce the pellet clad interaction, 
the rate of power increase at higher power is limited to 
around 0.5 %/hr for initial start-up after core loading and 
also after a long period of low power operation. After a 
sufficient preconditioning is finished, the rate of power 
ascension is increased to 3 %/hr, which is clearly on the 
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safe side well under the figures recommended by fuel manu-
facturers. With this operation it takes a week to reach full 
power before preconditioning. The immediate goal is to veri-
fy the fv2l integrity which makes it possible to reach full 
power in one or two days before preconditioning by power 
increase rate of 3 X/hr. The goal of long term is to bring 
the plant response ability to 5 X/min as designed or close 
to that level. 
(b) Operation by Automatic Frequency Control (AFC): Presently, 
nuclear plants are operated with constant load, i.e. not 
in AFC mode where the frequency of the grid regulates the 
plant power corresponding to the hour-to-hour demand. With 
an increasing percentage of nuclear power generation, ope-
ration by AFC becomes necessary. Then the plant dynamic 
characteristics must be analyzed for each input signal from 
the grid; correspondingly, fuel integrity must be verified 
in relation to local power conditions such as rate and mag-
nitude of local power increase, local power change frequency 
etc. 
(c) Load-Follow Operation: This will be required for nuclear 
power plants possibly starting in 1985, for example with 
the pattern 12-3-6-3 (100X - 50X rated power), (i.e. 12 
hrs at 100X, 3 hrs decrease to 50X, hold 50X for 3 hrs, 
3 hrs increase to 10OX). This can be done by changing the 
boron concentration and using only max. 30x control rod 
insertion. This results then in a power increase of about 
3 kW/m, above the preconditioning level at the position of 
peak local heat flux (about 36 kW/m). The corresponding 
power increase (above preconditioning level) in a fuel 
rod adjacent to the control rod is 7-10 kW/m, but this 
is in the upper part of the core where the general power 
level is lower. The rate of change in core average power 
(20-23 kW/m) is of the order of 0.05 kW/m.min, i.e. very 
gradual. 
Although there are not so many ramp test data on PWR fuel, if 
the ramp test data of CANDU type and BWR type fuels may be coun-
ted in for evaluation, the local power increment and attained 
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local power level as mentioned before are considered to be less 
than their critical values which have been obtained from the 
above ramp test data. This suggests that it is possible, at 
least theoretically, to conduct the load follow operation men-
tioned here on the present fuel specifications. 
A test plan has been established to verify fuel integrity so 
that load follow operation may possibly start in 1985. This 
includes several ramp programs in test reactors and also a con-
trol rod withdrawal test in a power reactor. Finally, response 
and controllability of the plant as a whole will be analyzed 
in actual daily load follow operation. 
Desirable Load Following Characteristics for Nuclear Power 
Plant on the TVA System (Ratliff, TVA) (C3) 
By the mid-to-late 1980's, current predictions indicate that 
nuclear units on the Tennessee Valley Authority's system may 
have to routinely manoeuvre to accomodate daily load swings. 
Nuclear fuel designs capable of daily power cycling between 
100% and 75* of full power are considered essential and similar 
power cycling between 100% and 50% very desireable. The cycling 
schedule would be 12-3-6-3 (same as in the preceding paper by 
Nagino, Kansai Power). 
Variations de charge et replace de la frequence. Adaption des 
besoins du réseau et des possibilités des tranche PWR (Power 
Variation and Frequency Control. Adaption of Grid Needs and 
PWR Plant Possibilities). (Burger et al., EDF), (C4) 
EDF PWR plants will be required to participate in load following 
to an increasing extent from 1980-81. Programmed power variations 
must be possible at a rate of 2%/min. of nominal power. In compen-
sating for forecast error or production unit loss, (unplanned) 
power variations at 5%/min. will be necessary. Automatic fre-
quency control must be possible within a band of -5% of nominal 
power; inside such a band, manual power variation must be possi-
ble at 1.5%/min, exceptionally at 4.5%/min. 
Present PWR plants do not meet these requirements. Programmed, 
large power variations may occur by variation of the boron 
concentration; this permits about 2%/min. at the beginning of 
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the cycle and 0.3x/min. at the end of the cycle. It is believed 
that frequency control operation for extended periods will be 
possible within -2.5X. 
To improve the situation, "grey control rods" are being developed; 
because of their reduced neutron absorption, they will give less 
pronounced changes in axial power shape. A load-follow experi-
ment is underway in a small prototype power reactor (CAP). as 
described by Dodelier in the last paper at the meeting (C22). 
Power Ramping/Cycling Experience and Operational Recowwndations 
in KWU Power Plants (von Jan et al., KWU) (C6) 
The paper summarizes the KWU power cycling and ramping experience 
as well as operating recommendations which were published at the 
Petten and Portland meetings (papers A6 by Holzer et al.» and 
Bll by von Jan et al., respectively) and other previous occasions. 
PCI-OGRAMS: Application of CANDU/FUELOGRAM Methodology to PCI 
Data from Light Water Reactors (Wood, AECL) (c7) 
Data compiled from normal reactor operation of a BWR described 
the irradiation histories of 302 fuel assemblies, 65 of which 
contained at least one defective fuel rod. The rod power increases. 
powers and burnups judged to be the most severe, in the reactor 
cycle immediately preceding testing of whether the assembly was 
intact or defective, were extracted from data printouts. The 
data were plotted to show ramped power and power increase versus 
burnup (in the range up to approximately 25,000 MWD/tU). Thres-
hold curves were drawn beneath the defects using CANDU thres-
holds (for dwelltime above 2.5 hrs) at low burnups where the 
BWR data were sparse. The FUELOGRAM methodology previously de-
veloped for CANDU fuel was then used to evaluate defect proba-
bilities in terms of ramped power, power increase and burnup. 
The fuel defect thresholds at burnups of 20,000-25,000 HWD/tU 
were about 20 kw/m ramped power and 5 kW/m power increase. No 
account was taken of ramp rate because this was not included 
in the data. Ramp rates experienced during normal operation of 
a BWR would probably be fast compared with the operating re-
commentadion of 0.2 kW/m. hr for safe startup at the beginning 
of a BWR cycle. 
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Power Raac Experiments in the Saclear Power Plant Biblis-A 
(Hansel et al.. KWO/RWE) (Cll) 
This paper presents in some detail results from the two in-situ 
power reactor ramp tests that were summarised briefly in the 
paper by Holzer et al. at the Petten meeting (A6). 
Two standard PMP. fuel assemblies were irradiated at core corner 
positions during their first cycle. For each of the respective 
second cycles, these fuel assemblies were loaded in the core 
center position with a special control assembly inserted. At 
the end of the second cycle, the control assembly was rapidly 
withdrawn from the fuel assembly, resulting in local ramp rates 
in the range 3 - 1 3 kw/m.mih. In order to achieve higher ter-
minal powers and larger power ramps certain control rods were 
operated in a non-standard manner one week before the ramp ex-
periments. The terminal power distribution was maintained for 
48 hrs. 
No failures occurred in either of the experiments. Details are 
as follows: 
Assembly 
Number 
190 
258 
Burnup, MKD/tU 
avg. assy. 
24,220 
19.070 
Peak local power. 
Latest pre-ramp 
24-26 
28.5-31.5 
ktf/m 
Terminal 
34-36 
40.7 
Post-irradiation of assembly 190 revealed no difference in dia-
meter decrease between ramped and non-ramped fuel rods. However, 
circumferential ridges at pellet interfaces were slightly more 
pronounced on rods with the highest ramp terminal power. Fission 
gas releases were within the scatter band of standard PWR rods, 
although the ramped rods released somewhat more (4-5*) than 
non-ramped rods (just below It). 
Power Ramo Failures in Water Reactor Fuel Elements. Experience 
from Power Reactors. Likely Mechanisms and Potential Remedies. 
(Gittus et al., UKAEA) (C12) 
The ramp performance experience presented in this paper is an 
overview of information presented elsewhere, including the Petten 
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and Portland meetings. 
The Combined Use of Test Reactor Experiments and Power Reactor 
Tests for Development of PCI-Resistent Fuel (Jungkrans et al., 
ASEA-ATOM) (C14) 
Conclusions are presented from previous AS2A-AT0M publications. 
Fuel performance related items are: 
- PCI failure levels in test reactor (R2) ramps for medium 
burnup fuel (15,000-25,000 MWD/tU) comprising some tens 
.of test rods is typically of the order of 45 kW/m. 
- When some thousands of full-size rods are exposed to 
fast ramps,a small number of low-probability failures 
can be generated at power ratings below 40 kW/m; they 
are not necessarily accompanied by either plastic defor-
mation of the cladding, excessive fission gas release 
or UO- grain growth. 
- By far the most powerful way of reducing the probability 
of PCI-failure was found to be to restrict the ramp rate 
and to avoid step-wize power changes. 
- There is reasonable agreement between results from ramp 
tests in a test reactor, e.g. R2, and in a power reactor 
provided corrections are taken for 
(i) low-probability failures, 
(ii) that the power increase rate in a power reactor 
may be much faster than in a test reactor, 
(iii) that the power profile in a power reactor may be 
axially distorted during the ramp in a power reactor. 
- An illustration to the fact that an improved fuel design 
needs broad verification before it is accepted is the 
case of graphite coating. A matrix of various limited 
design modifications was inserted in Oskarshamn-1 and 
ramp tested at a burnup of 15,000 MWD/tU. All concepts 
showed the same behaviour in that one or several rods 
failed at a power level of ^50 kW/m. The exception, 
however, was graphite coating, where all rods survived 
the ramp up to 65 kW/m. 
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Improved CANDU Fuel Performance (Summary of Previous AECL 
Publications) (Wood et al., AECL) (C15) 
Of some 150,000 CANDU fuel bundles irradiated in power reactors 
only 0.18% have failed. Most defects occurred before 1973 in the 
Douglas Point and Pickering-1 reactors. 169 bundles have been 
confirmed defective, 134 defects resulted from power ramping. 
The incidence of defects was greatly reduced as a result of the 
following measures: 
- the introduction of graphite CANLUB fuel, and 
- changing the fuelling sequence, thereby flattening the 
flux profile and reducing the peak power from 60 to 53 
kW/m. Also the adjuster rod insertion sequence was changed 
to avoid power transients on starting up the reactors 
following a short-term shutdown. 
(Twenty bundles have defected because of either porous end plugs 
or end plug welds, handling damage, or flow-induced fretting. 
The cause of the remaining 15 defects have not been ascertained). 
Since 1972, the fuel bundle defect rate has been 0.06*. 
One type of CANLUB fuel has a coating of baked graphite on the 
inside surface of the Zircaloy cladding. Another type has a 
coating of a baked siloxane (organic silicon-oxygen compound) 
with finely divided silica. 
Margins of improvement with these coatings were established 
under test reactor conditions in terms of failure thresholds 
of ramped power and power increase. When graphite CANLUB was 
compared to uncoated cladding, the lowest burnup with observed 
failures was increased from about 1,200 to 3,000 MWD/tU; above 
4,000 MWD/tU there was a 50% improvement in ramped power and 
100% or more in power increase. The experience with siloxane 
is more limited but encouraging with siloxane CANLUB; no defects 
were experienced at powers relevant to CANDU power reactors but 
two rods did defect when they were inadvertently overpowered to 
central U02 melting. Four bundles of each type were power ramped 
in Douglas Point to powers greater than normal; there was one 
defect with graphite and none with siloxane. 
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The Studsvik Inter-Ramp Project. An International Power Ramp 
Experimental Study (Mogard et al., Studsvik) (C17) 
This paper was identical with the similarly entitled Portland 
presentation (paper B30). 
Interaction combustible-oaine. Experience CEA-FRAMATOME sur 
crayons préirradiés en réacteur de puissance (Pellet-Clad Inter*-
action. CEA-FRAMATOME Experience on Fuel Rods Pre-irradiated in 
a Power Reactor) (Atabek et al., CEA/FRAMATOME) (C18) 
Initial results with 2 m long fuel rods pre-ramp irradiated in 
the BR3 PWR are presented. Max. burnup levels were 10,000-16,500 
(6 tests) and 25,400 MWD/tU (1 test) at power levels presumably 
somewhat below 20 kW/m. Prior to the ramp testing, preconditio-
ning was carried out at about 18 or 35 kw/m for 3 days. Ramp 
rate was then approximately 5 kW/m.min. 
All the lower burnup tests failed (although not all released 
activity to the coolant) at ramp terminal levels of 50-60 kW/m. 
The one high-burnup test was pre-conditioned at 34.5 kW/m and 
then ramped to 41 kW/m without failure. 
Fuel restructuring and fission gas release appeared to occur 
rapidly in the lower burnup tests. The "steady state" fuel 
structure was, for example, more or less reached after 15 min. 
hold-time at 57 kW/m. In another tes*-, the amount of fission 
gas released (25-30 *) after 49 hrs at 56-57 kw/m was of the 
same order of magnitude as during "steady state" at the same 
power. 
The Behaviour of Defective Fuel Under Fower Cycling Conditions 
(Anand et al., Bhabha Atomic Research Centre) (C20) 
An experiment was conducted with an intentionally defected fuel 
rod, to study the release of activity with power changes, activi-
ty build-up in closed loop operation and residual activity after 
removal of U02 fuel. The defect was a 0.4 mm hole in one end 
plug. The pin was subjected to a total of 61 cycles of various 
magnitudes, the max. linear heat load being 12 kW/m. in the 
first month of irradiation, no significant release of activity 
was observed, but later on, a sudden increase in activity was 
observed during every power increase. The irradiation was termi-
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nated after 145 days. No enlargement of defect size was observed 
in post-irradiation examination, presumably because of the low 
fuel rating. 
Evaluation of Cladding Inteoritv of Ramr Tested UO_-Zr Fuel Pins 
(Knudsen et al., RISØ) (C21) 
Non-destructive and destructive observations are compared and 
used to evaluate the cladding integrity of fuel pins from pre-
viously reported ramp tests, including the paper by Knudsen et 
al. at the Portland meeting (B28). 
Simulation in an Experimental Reactor of a Load Follow and 
Remote Control Operation (Dodelier et al., FRAMATOME/CEA) (C22) 
An experiment is described where load follow (planned power 
changes) and remote control (adjustments according to grid 
needs) operation is simulated in an experimental PWR. The simu-
lation comprizes 12 fuel elements of standard 17x17 geometry, 
except for length which is 1.8 m. Eight CEA fuel elements have 
1 at. fill gas, whereas the rods of the four FRAMATOME elements 
are pre-pressurized to 32 at. 
Details of the operational mode are as follows. The load follow 
cycles have a reduced power at 75* of rated power in 30* of the 
cases, 50« in 60% of the cases and 30« in 10* of the cases. The 
corresponding power increase rates are max. 0.5, 0.5-1,5, and 
min.l.5*/min., respectively. During 50* of its life, the fuel 
is subjected to a remote control amplitude of -6.5* (of rated 
power) around the instantaneous power level. (No specific in-
formation is given regarding the frequency of the load swings 
simulating load follow and remote control). 
At the present, the total number of load cycles is 300 and 200 
for CEA and FRAMATOME assemblies. The corresponding average 
burnups are 22,000 and 11,000 MWD/tU. The below table gives 
the max. power variations and corresponding power levels during 
load follow and remote control transients: 
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AP / P 
kW/m 
1st cycle 
2nd cycle 
3rd cycle 
CEA 
Load follow 
18/30 
26/29 
24/27 
Remote control 
10/22 
12/23 
7/18 
FRAMATOME 
Load follow 
27/38 
25/29 
Remote control 
3/30 
11/22 
to be carried out 
So far, there is no indication from the primary coolant activity 
level that this mode of operation has caused any damage to the 
fuel rods. 
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FUEL PERFORMANCE IN THE THREE-MILE ISLAND (TMI) ACCIDENT 
Review_of_Pagers 
Evaluation of Long-Term Post-Accident Core Cooling of Three-
Mile Island - Unit 2 (NUREG-0557) (Dl) 
From the histories of system pressure and coolant temperature, 
it is inferred that the core was uncovered and allowed to heat 
up for significant periods of time during the first hours of 
the accident. These periods correspond approximately with the 
major periods when system pressure was below the saturation 
pressure; they are about 1.7-3, 3.5-5.5 and 7.5-14 hrs into the 
accident. Although the two later periods of uncovery may have 
produced additional core damage, the first period (beginning 
shortly after 1.5 hrs) is considered the most important because 
decay heat was larger then and because that period produced the 
large radiation instrument reading (at 2.5 hrs) in the contain-
ment indicating major fuel damage. 
The assessment of the core damage is derived from various measure-
ments and their evaluation (in lack of direct observation), such 
as fission product and hydrogen measurements, coolant tempera-
ture, pressure and flow, excore icn chambers and incore self-
powered neutron detectors. This assessment is summarized as 
follows: 
The cladding for many or all fuel elements may have ballooned 
and ruptured early in the accident. This mode of initial defecting 
is probably irrelevant in light of later, more extensive damage 
by oxidation and embrittled fracture of many fuel elements. 
In the hot upper central region of the core, fuel temperatures 
probably exceeded 1750°C releasing large quantities of fission 
products; radiochemical analyses indicate that about 30* of the 
total core inventory of noble gases was released into the pri-
mary coolant system. The 1750°C temperature is less than the 
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UO_ melting point. Temperatures sufficient to cause fuel pellet 
melting (2800°C) were probably not reached. 
It is estimated that about 40* of the Zircaloy cladding reacted 
with water. The region of most severe oxidation probably was 
localized above the 0.6 to 1.8 K elevation, with more severe 
oxidation in the central bundles than in the peripheral bundles. 
Significant melting of partly oxidized cladding may also have 
occurred, and this material would have solidified when core 
cooling was re-established. The severely oxidized (and perhaps 
fused) cladding probably fragmented upon quenching. The resulting 
fuel element debris is probably composed of pieces ranging from 
millimeter size to whole sections of fuel rods. 
The temperature of unfueled components would lag the temperature 
of fuel rods by only about 10 C so that they also should have 
experienced temperatures above about 1700°C. Consequently, Zir-
caloy components in the hot region of the core should have oxi-
dized, and components with Inconel, stainless steel, and Ag-In-Cd 
should have melted. Because of r^ any layers of protective sheating 
in the instrument tube the incore thermocouple tubes have survived 
even in the damaged core region, although the outer sheath of 
the instrument tube may be badly damaged. 
Nearly all of the broken and oxidized fuel element debris should 
remain trapped in the upper core region because the fuel assembly 
end fittings at the top of the core have a grillage that would 
act as a screen. Furthermore, the compaction of fuel debris is 
limited because the fuel pellets are fabricated with a packing 
fraction of about 46* and the theoretical maximum packing fraction 
(for a bed of spherical particles) is only about 63*. It is very 
likely that fuel debris is also trapped in some mixing cups 
surrounding the incore thermocouples, contributing to non-uni-
form thermocouple readings. 
It is reasonably certain that the central region of the core is 
almost entirely blocked to normal coolant flow. This blockage 
is probably due to a 0.9 to 1.8 m thick layer of fuel and struc-
tural debris. The lower elevations in this central region of the 
core might be relatively undamaged and unblocked. The condition 
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of the core peripheral region is more difficult to evaluate. An 
assumption of the center region being more than 99* blocked and 
the peripheral region approximately 90x blocked would appear 
consistent with an average core blockage of 93*, estimated from 
flow and thermocouple data. 
Fuel Performance - What Next ? (Panel Discussion at the Portland 
Meeting 29 April - 3 May 1979) (D2) 
It was considered (J. T. A. Roberts, EPRI) that it will probably 
be (at least) 12 months before the pressure vessel will be opened. 
Analysis of Three-Mile Island Unit 2 Accident (NSAC-1) (D3) 
The incore instrumentation which monitors core status indicated 
high temperatures and some intermittent voiding of the coolant 
in at least the upper region of the core early in the accident. 
The neutron detectors outside the reactor vessel indicated 
possible intermittent voiding from about 1.5 to 3.5 hrs. The in-
core thermocouples, located in the core outlet plenum, and the 
selfpowered neutron detectors located within the core, indicated 
high temperatures beginning about 2.3 hrs into the accident. 
Flux detector response and primary system behaviour at 3.8 hrs 
indicate an apparent collapse of core material as a result of 
prior damage. One set of temperature measurements between 4 and 
5.5 hrs indicate some temperatures in the region of 1400°C, but 
others were below 370°C around the outer edge of the core. All 
temperatures above the core center remained above 370°C (instru-
ment scale limit) for about 8 hrs, and some remained above 370°c 
for up to 30 hrs. 
The sequence of events, instrument responses, core exit thermo-
couple readings, the hydrogen produced and the fission product 
escape to the reactor building all suggest extensive damage 
(oxidation) of fuel rod cladding. Because there was subsequent 
re-entry of cooling water to the hot core, it is expected that 
some fragmentation of the oxidized cladding and possibly some 
of the uranium oxide has occurred. The present evidence makes 
it appear that there was no general fuel melting. However, loca-
lized melting of some of the non-fuel materials in the core 
can reasonably be inferred. The measurements of total hydrogen 
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inventory after the accident indicate that about one third of 
all the Zircaloy in the core reacted with the reactor coolant. 
Despite the extensive damage to the core region, the transition 
to cooling of reactor coolant by natural circulation (30 days 
after the accident), with relatively low core outlet temperatures 
measured since then, indicates a coolable configuration has been 
maintained. 
Future supplements to this report will include papers on "Hydro-
gen Phenomena" and "Core Damage Assessment". 
Investigation into the March 28. 1979 Three-Mile Island Accident 
by Office of Inspection and Enforcement (NUREG-0600) (D5) 
The report includes a rather detailed account of various instru-
ment signals that could be relevant for fuel performance assess-
ment. The relatively few inferences made about possible core 
damage appear to be in agreement with the above reports. 
Questions Raised about Reaualifvino TMI-2 Reactor Vessel 
(Nucleonics Week) (D6) 
It is said from the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC/EPRI) 
that new data tend to show that there was not enough steam being 
generated in most core regions for a zirconium-water exothermic 
reaction which would boost temperatures to the eutectic (about 
1920°c) at which there would be interactive melting between 
zirconium and uranium oxide. Thus the extent of melting was 
potentially less than in an NRC analysis by a considerable 
margin. 
Analysis of a TMI-2 Water Sample Indicates Less Fuel Rod Damage 
(Nucleonics Week) (D7) 
Samples taken from the water in the TMI-2 containment basement 
contained less fission product activity than expected. This is 
taken as an indication that there was little or no fuel melting. 
Preparations are being made for the first entry into the TMI-2 
containment since the accident. Actual entry is not expected 
in 1979, however. 
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Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three-
Mile Island (D9) 
It is estimated that there were failures in the cladding around 
90X of the fuel rods. 44-63X of the zirconium in the core was 
oxidized. As a result of oxidation and embrittlement of the 
cladding "several feet" of the upper part of the core fell into 
the gaps between the fuel rods causing partial blocking of the 
flow of steam or water. 
Fuel temperatures may have exceeded 2200°C in the upper 30-40X 
of the core. Temperatures in parts of the damaged fuel that 
were not effectively cooled may have reached the melting point 
of the uranium oxide, about 288Q°C. A study suggests that some 
of the fuel may have become liquid at temperatures above 1930°c 
by dissolving in a zirconium-zirconium oxide mixture. The study 
estimates that the amount of fuel that may have melted by this 
process is from zero to a few X of the core. An independent 
analysis suggests that the formation of such a mixture was un-
likely. 
Substantial fractions of the material in the control rods melted. 
There is no indication that any core material made contact with 
the steel pressure vessel at a temperature above the melting point 
of steel (1550°C). 
Core Damage (Technical Staff Report) (D10) 
The core damage assessment was based on: inventory of hydrogen 
released, measured fission products released to coolant and con-
tainment, and thermal-hydraulic analysis. This resulted in the 
following findings: 
(1) NRC requires that nuclear power reactors shall be designed 
to remain within the following limits: (a) Peak cladding 
temperature shall not exceed 1205°C. (b) The zirconium 
cladding oxidized shall not exceed 17* of cladding thickness, 
(c) The total amount of hydrogen generated from the zirconium-
water reaction shall not exceed IX of that producible by 
oxidizing all of the fuel cladding. At TMI-2, all these 
limits were exceeded. 
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(2) 90« or more of the fuel rods have burst. 
(3) A hydrogen inventory indicates that 44-63* of all the 
zirconium in the reactor has been oxidized. The upper 
60-70« of the zirconium clad is so embrittled that it has 
lost its structural integrity. 
(4) Fuel temperature exceeded 1930°C throughout the upper 
40-50« of the core. Fuel temperature may have exceeded 2200°C 
throughout 30-40« of the core volume. 
(5) Some of the UO~ fuel may have become liquid at tempera-
tures well below its melting temperature of 2880°C. There 
is general agreement that some fuel was liquefied at TMZ-2 
but no general agreement on the extent of the liquefaction. 
Determination of the amount of fuel liquefied at TMI-2 
must await actual inspection of the reactor fuel itself. 
(6) Continuing leaching of radioactive Cs, I, Sr, and Ba into 
the reactor's cooling water indicates that some of the fuel 
is in finely divided form. 
(7) From rapidly changed readings of both the in-core self-
powered and ex-core source-range neutron detectors at 3.8 
hrs after start of the accident, EPRI's Nuclear Safety 
Analysis Center surmises that a section of the core suddenly 
slumped downward as a consequence of earlier damage. The 
staff agrees. 
(8) In the hottest portions of the core, sections of the control 
rods probably melted. Because the constituents of the rods 
are essentially insoluble in water, the neutron poisons the 
rods contained are very likely still in the core. 
(9) Slumping of the core (as in 7 above) increases core reactivi-
ty, but the core is not close to becoming critical. Even 
if the core slumps to its point of greatest reactivity and 
even if the neutron poisons in the control rods are somehow 
removed from the core, the core can be kept subcritical if 
its cooling water contains at least 3180 parts of boron per 
million parts of water (by weight). At present Metropolitan 
Edison is maintaining 3500 parts per million by adding boric 
acid. 
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Chemistry (Technical Staff Report) (DID 
The following topics at TMI-2 were reviewed: zirconium's reactions 
with water and the fuel U0_; the fission products released frost 
the fuel elements; and the hydrogen produced and its likelihood 
of exploding in the reactor vessel. The following is extracted 
frost the findings: 
(1) Fran the Measured fission products, approximately 50S of 
the core is assumed to have exceeded 2200°C. 
(2) 90« or more of the fuel rods ruptured their zirconium cladding. 
(3) There is a limited amount of experimental data indicating 
that the 00, fuel can dissolve in a partially-oxidized 
liquid of Zr at about 1900°c. The significance of the data 
is that sos« liquid reactor fuel could result frost tempera-
tures well below the 28tO°C temperature for melting UOj. 
One reference further postulates that there is the possibi-
lity of forsang a low-temperature-melting eutectic between 
UO and zirconiiB* at temperatures of 1300-1850°C. Another 
reference shows that the total amount of liquid formed must 
have been snail at TMJ-2. 
(4) S o w of the IX>2 fuel is finely divided, and its fission 
products are being slowly leached by the reactor coolant. 
(5) The estimated asount of hydrogen generated is frost 44 to 
63« of the hydrogen capable of being produced frost reacting 
with water and all the zirconium in the reactor. 
(6) Because 18« oxidation severely embrittles zirconium, the 
upper 60-70« of the fuel clad is so embrittled that it has 
lost its structural integrity. 
Status in the Understanding of TMI (N. V. Johnston - NRC/SIG) (D12) 
At 1.2 and 1.7 hrs into the accident, the reactor coolant pumps 
were stopped due to high vibration, with the expectation that 
natural circulation would occur. It has been estimated that the 
coolant level then equalized to about 0.3 m above the top of 
the core. Up to this time the core had not been damaged. 
The temperature transient which damaged the fuel, now began 
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with the boil-down of the coolant. The decay heat had reduced 
to about IX of fuel power, but was sufficient to cause the 
coolant level to drop at a rate of 0.3 m every 4-5 min. At about 
2.5 hrs into the accident, substantial fractions were uncovered 
and had experienced sustained high temperatures. This temperature 
transient caused the initial fission product release and metal 
water reaction resulting in a very brittle upper half of the 
core. Furthermore, there are strog indications that thermal 
shocks or some other event at about 3.8 hrs caused a substantial 
change of geometry of the core, possibly forming what has been 
called a rubble bed in the upper portions of the core. There 
remains some uncertainty of the highest temperatures reached 
during this period and whether or not there was some additional 
periods of core uncovery during the first 12 hrs. 
Analysis of Three-Mile-Island Accident Using TRAC (Ireland -
LA-UR-79-2849) (D13) 
Using the TRAC code, the TMI-2 plant was simulated during the 
first 3 hrs of the accident. The following is extracted from 
this analysis. 
After the loop pumps are tripped at 1.7 hrs, phase separation 
occurs throughout the system. This results in partial core un-
covering and loss of coolant circulation through the loops. At 
2 hrs, upper core temperatures begin to rise rapidly (0.25 C/s). 
At 2.3 hrs, the pressurizer relief block valve is closed resul-
ting in a gradual increase in core liquid inventory. At about 
2.7 hrs, the water inventory in the core has boiled down again 
such that water is present in the lower plenum and partially 
in the lower core, resulting in a steep axial temperature gra-
dient in the core. Since upward-moving steam velocities are 
very low (less than 0.1 m/s) the steam becomes very superheated 
in the upper part of the core and, as a result, the cladding and 
fuel heat up rapidly. When the cladding temperatures reach 1030°C, 
zirconium-steam reactions (exothermic) begin and the upper core 
temperatures begin rising at about 1.0°C/s. This temperature 
excursion was probably terminated in the accident when the HPI 
(high-pressure injection) was returned to nonthrottled flow 
rates at 3.3 hrs, enhancing the core cooling rate (TRAC calcu-
D-ll 
lations were terminated at 3 h since the core modeling was no 
longer realistic). 
The calculated maximum hot-rod cladding temperature is shown up 
to 3 hrs. It is close to 300 C up to 2 hrs and then increases 
to 1450°C at 3 hrs (without indication of a maximum there). 
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